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Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes? 
by Anthony D’Amato*, 75 Va. L. Rev. 561-603 (1989) 
 
Abstract:  An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to determine 
the content of a statutory text that otherwise, in splendid isolation, could be deconstructed by simply positing different 
interpretive contexts. I examine the same issue by recounting my own quest for determinate meaning in statutes—a sort 
of personal legislative history. I do not claim for jurisprudence the role of ensuring faithful reception of the legislature's 
message, for that is impossible.  At best, jurisprudential theory only reduces the degrees of interpretive freedom, and 
then only probably, not necessarily. The more significant thesis of this article is that all theories of statutory interpreta-
tion can only do that much and no more. 
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[pg561]** An aspect of the current battle over deconstruction [FN1] is whether resort to legislative 
intent might help to determine the content of a statutory text that otherwise, in splendid isolation, 
could be deconstructed by simply positing different interpretive contexts.  Thus, a doctrinalist might 
argue that one can obtain a degree of certainty of meaning of any legal text by referring beyond the 
text itself to the intention of its author.[FN2] Because no interpreter has direct knowledge of the 
mind of the author, the author's "intention" seems to constitute another text—a point of reference 
separate from and in addition to the primary text that is the subject of interpretation.  The question is 
whether we can use this other text—this "evidence" of authorial intent—to pin down the meaning of 
a statute.  Professor Michael Moore is among those who would have liked to use "intention" as a 
possible way to find determinate meaning in a statute, but after thorough consideration he reluc-
tantly concluded that the meaning of a [pg562] statute cannot be ascertained by recourse to legisla-
tive intent.[FN3] His approach was entirely formal.[FN4] In this Article I examine the same issue 
by recounting my own quest for determinate meaning in statutes—a sort of personal legislative his-
tory.  My conclusion will deviate slightly from Moore's, as I believe that a legislature can use its 
audience's own theories of interpretation to influence probabilities of how its statutes are likely to be 
interpreted.[FN5] 
Statutes are certainly the dominant form of law in our times.  The theory of positivism tells us 
that law is a command—one that emanates for the most part from legislatures, but sometimes from 
prior judicial decisions.[FN6] Accordingly, much of current legal scholarship has been devoted to 
the question of legislative and constitutional interpretation. [FN7] My starting point, however—in 
alignment with Stanley Fish [FN8]—is that there can never be a definitive theory or set of rules of 
interpretation. 
Here is a simple proof of that proposition.  We begin by assuming that which we are trying to 
disprove: namely, that there is a theory of interpretation—some set of rules or formulae, an essay, a 
book, several volumes of books, or all the books one reads in three years of law school—that we 
can consult in order to learn how to interpret any legislative enactment. [FN9] Then we ask: What 
are the rules for interpreting this assumed theory of interpretation?  Must we look to the biographies 
of the scholars who came up with these rules or formulae or books to resolve questions concerning 
what they mean in specific [pg563] cases?  Or is it impermissible to look to their biographies?  
Should we interpret their words according to definitions in Black's Law Dictionary or any other le-
gal source?  These questions suggest that we need a meta-theory of interpretation to enable us to 
interpret the rules or formulae or books of interpretation.  But such a meta-theory would constitute a 




tion in order to be interpreted.  We thus proceed into infinite regress.  Because we cannot consult an 
infinite number of theories in a finite amount of time, we must conclude that any general theory of 
interpretation is impossible. 
Nevertheless, statutes are "interpreted" all the time, and those who do the interpretation typically 
think that they are following certain explicit or implicit rules.  Of course no one can deny that many 
judges, lawyers, and scholars say that they "interpret" statutes according to time-honored rules and 
principles of interpretation; the question is whether their activities are actually constrained by any 
such rules or principles.[FN10] Deconstructionists, following Professor Fish, claim that any rules of 
interpretation judges and lawyers say or think that they are following are in fact the product of the 
way they have chosen to interpret the statute.  Their actual mental procedure is as follows: (1) read 
the statute; (2) notice that your reading of the statute seems best to fit one of a large number of 
"rules of statutory interpretation" that you are acquainted with; (3) tell your audience that in inter-
preting the statute you followed that rule.  I do not claim that this rationalization is disingenuous; 
rather, it seems to be the way the mind works with respect to all theory, not just theories of interpre-
tation. [FN11] 
 [pg564] Yet I think there is something to be said for the idea that our state of mind when we 
look at a statute—a state of mind that may partially be described by "rules of interpretation"—may 
at least somewhat influence what we think the statute means.  Einstein remarked that everything we 
see reflects what we think we are seeing.[FN12] Surely our understanding of every statute we read 
reflects what we think we are reading.  Hence whatever theories fill our minds partially form the 
context within which we read texts.  My thesis in this Article is that the anticipated mental context 
of addressees partially shapes the strategy of legislators in formulating statutes.  Because legislators 
know that the addressees of their statutes will interpret those statutes according to whatever contexts 
and theories the addressees have in mind, and know further that the addressees will (probably) not 
be able to break through those contexts to choose among a much larger set of possible interpreta-
tions, rational legislatures will take the anticipated mind-sets of addressees into account in choosing 
how to write statutes.  This is at least the thesis I want to expound here, and although it may seem to 
run counter to some of Fish's arguments, it accepts his main conclusion: there is no such thing as a 
prescription for interpretation. 
Accordingly, I shall look at "interpretation" in a light that departs from mainstream interpretive 
scholarship.  I will argue that interpretation is a stage in the process of communication between the 
legislature that enacts a statute and the members of the judiciary (or practicing bar or the public) 
who are the addressees of the statute.  I shall argue that the legislature, in order more effectively to 
communicate its command, initially wants to know something about the mind-set of the addressee.  
The legislature, after all, does not want to launch its statutes into the void; rather, it has in mind a 
certain class of addressees, who might typically be expected to react in various ways to the legisla-
tive message.  The expected reaction of the addressees [pg565] thus becomes a factor in the legisla-
ture's output. [FN13] It is in the legislature's interest to reduce, if possible, the degrees of freedom 
that attend the addressee's interpretive processes. 
 
I.  COMMUNICATION IS CONSTRAINED BY THE RECEIVER'S MIND-SET 
Any person, such as a legislator, who issues an order is engaged in a process of communication.  




sonable accuracy.  Because each person (judges, attorneys, the public) who reads or hears the legis-
lative message necessarily interprets it, the legislator may conclude that the more she knows about 
the interpretive processes of her audience, the more she can tailor the words of the statute so that the 
audience will interpret it the way she wants it to be interpreted. 
The clearest illustration is a coded message.  If military headquarters wants to send a message in 
code to its officers in the field, it must have previously communicated with those officers in order to 
inform them how to decipher the code.  The communication could take the form of training, of 
handing over a decoding book, or of handing over a programmed computer (a cipher) that will do 
the decoding.  The very idea of a secret code presupposes at least one communication between 
sender and receiver other than the code message itself.[FN14] That one communication conveys the 
decoding instructions—the "key" to the code.  The communication of the key is necessary to pre-
pare the addressee to decode the message. 
 [pg566] It is necessary, but not sufficient.  Suppose a code—"78987452112361"—is received 
and decoded (interpreted) as "attack at 0700 hours." The decoded message can still be ambiguous.  
For example, does "attack at 7 a.m." mean the time the bombers should cross the enemy's borders or 
the time that the bombs should be dropped?  The message is ambiguous between at least two possi-
bilities of when the "attack" should take place.  If the officer who receives the coded message has 
been kept in the dark about what other units are doing, he may have no way to resolve the ambigu-
ity.  Any reader of the detailed military histories of World War II knows that there were countless 
instances of misinterpreted messages resulting in enormous casualties.[FN15] As the war went on, 
the rate of misinterpretations declined as senders and receivers became accustomed to the varied 
contexts in which messages had to be interpreted.[FN16] Even so, such breakdowns occurred even 
between trained senders and receivers working within codes designed to convey precise messages 
about a relatively narrow subject-matter. 
Thus in sending a coded message, it is insufficient merely to have someone on the receiving end 
who can decode it; the sender also has to know something about the receiver's tendencies in inter-
preting messages.  But even if a great deal is known about the receiver's processes of interpretation, 
the message can still be ambiguous simply because the sender does not know the factual context in 
which the [pg567] receiver receives the message.  The ambiguity increases if the sender is increas-
ingly unsure about who the receiver is.  Perhaps the most extreme cases are attempts at extraterres-
trial communication [FN17] such as those included on the Pioneer 10 and Pioneer 11 space probes 
launched by the United States in 1972 and 1973.  Affixed to these probes were six-inch by nine-
inch plaques of gold-anodized aluminum with a message to our hypothetical neighbors in the Milky 
Way Galaxy.  Pains were taken to communicate a peaceful attitude as well as basic information 
such as our location within the galaxy in a manner that could be deciphered by extraterrestrials.  A 
drawing of human beings also was included. [FN18] Although many have speculated as to how any 
possible extraterrestrials might interpret the message, let us suppose that we receive a "return" mes-
sage from outer space in apparently plain English. [FN19] How could we possibly "interpret" it?  
No matter how "familiar" the words, we could have no idea that the words mean the same thing to 
the sender as they do to us. [FN20] A related problem is that the distant galaxy might be trying to 
fool us.  Having beamed in on our radio and television transmissions   [FN21] after being [pg568] 
alerted to our presence by the Pioneer probes, they could have figured out what we wanted to hear 
while disguising their true purpose—which could be simply to scout us in order to decide whether 




In general, it appears to be impossible to interpret any text without ascribing desires, beliefs 
[FN23] or purposes to its author.  The very ascription of some set of desires, beliefs or purposes en-
ables us to give what we call "meaning" to the text.  Obviously, if we have no idea at all whether the 
attributes that we ascribe to the text-writer are true—for example, when we think a text is written by 
a non-human from another galaxy—we can be making a disastrous error in our "interpretation" of 
the text. 
Even if the sender knows something about the personality and mind-set of the receiver, the pos-
sibility of radical misinterpretation can never be reduced to zero.  Literature is full of examples of 
misinterpreted messages from master to servant.  French farces excel in misinterpreted communica-
tions: humor seems maximized the more a "literal" interpretation is grotesquely inappropriate in the 
circumstances.  More [pg569] recently, we have become familiar with the single-minded literalness 
of computers.  Norbert Wiener observed in God and Golem, Inc.: 
If you are playing a game according to certain rules and set the playing-machine to play for victory, you will 
get victory if you get anything at all, and the machine will not pay the slightest attention to any consideration ex-
cept victory according to the rules.  If you are playing a war game with a certain conventional interpretation of vic-
tory, victory will be the goal at any cost, even that of the extermination of your own side, unless this condition of 
survival is explicitly contained in the definition of victory according to which you program the machine. [FN24] 
Wittgenstein noted in his Philosophical Investigations, "Someone says to me: 'Shew the chil-
dren a game.' I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says 'I didn't mean that sort of game.'" 
[FN25] And Lon Fuller adds in "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers": 
The stupidest housemaid knows that when she is told "to peel the soup and skim the potatoes" her mistress 
does not mean what she says.  She also knows that when her master tells her to "drop everything and come run-
ning" he has overlooked the possibility that she is at the moment in the act of rescuing the baby from the rain barrel. 
[FN26] 
But why exactly did the master say "drop everything and come running" instead of "please come 
here?" We have to fill in the context prior to the master's statement.  Imagine previous communica-
tions between master and housemaid, where the latter interpreted "please come here" as meaning 
"whenever you're finished what you're doing, come here." [FN27] In order not to leave wholly up to 
the housemaid the judgment of when to come, the master has jumped to the opposite extreme and 
orders her to "drop everything and come running." He might even have added, "And I really mean 
it!" But training her in literalness can have its price.  If contrary to Professor Fuller's guess [pg570] 
the housemaid drops the baby into the rain barrel and explains later to her employer, "Well, you told 
me to drop everything!" she would be showing him the folly of teaching her a theory of literal inter-
pretation. 
The master-housemaid interaction could go back and forth without ever being resolved, ending 
either in tragedy or in a French farce.  Why in real life don't these misinterpretations continue un-
abated?  I venture to suggest that the sender of the messages learns over time how particular receiv-
ers of the messages tend to interpret them, and adjusts for those interpretations.  Error can never be 
completely avoided (because messages that seem unambiguous can turn out to be ambiguous if the 
receiver is in a factual context unknown to the sender [FN28], but the familiarity that obtains over 
time probably reduces error enough that life and communication can go on.  The master is upset 
when the experienced housemaid leaves her job, because that means he must endure another series 
of mistakes and misunderstandings while a new housemaid learns by trial and error what he proba-





II.  CAN THE MESSAGE PREPARE ITS AUDIENCE? 
In messages other than codes, where the receiver is indeterminate (as in all public legislation), is 
there any way to communicate the desired interpretation along with the message? [FN30] Consider 
the marvelous [pg571] opening paragraph of Vladimir Nabokov's novel, King, Queen, Knave: 
The huge black clock hand is still at rest but is on the point of making its once-a-minute gesture; that resilient 
jolt will set a whole world in motion.  The clock face will slowly turn away, full of despair, contempt, and bore-
dom, as one by one the iron pillars will start walking past, bearing away the vault of the station like bland atlantes; 
the platform will begin to move past, carrying off on an unknown journey cigarette butts, used tickets, flecks of 
sunlight and spittle; a luggage handcart will glide by, its wheels motionless; it will be followed by a news stall hung 
with seductive magazine covers—photographs of naked, pearl-gray beauties; and people, people, people on the 
moving platform, themselves moving their feet, yet standing still, striding forward, yet retreating as in an agonizing 
dream full of incredible effort, nausea, a cottony weakness in one's calves, will surge back, almost falling supine. 
[FN31] 
Obviously, a novel will be picked up by an enormously diverse group of potential readers.  
Some will read this first paragraph and say, "Another artsy incomprehensible book—not for me." 
Some might say, "Ridiculous—the author must be on a different planet." But others, whom 
Nabokov was probably trying to reach, may interpret the passage as indicating something more or 
less like the following: 
We have a passenger seated on a train looking out the window and waiting for the train to start, and when 
the minute hand of the big station clock makes its one-minute jump to the departure time, the train starts, and 
then the passenger—experiencing perhaps existential despair or regret of leaving the familiar world of the train 
station—views that world as if it is moving away from him while the train stands still, and sees his world of 
platform and station jolting into backward motion and being carried away from him piece by piece, while the 
people on the train platform react sluggishly (because they are moving in the same direction as the train, only 
more slowly) as in a dream that will inevitably take them backward into the void. 
The reader then reflects upon why the book began this way: 
By reporting literally what he saw, the passenger in effect was conveying something of his thoughts and 
feelings to me.  Nabokov, the [pg572] author, was able to let me see the train station from the passenger's point 
of view, recreating in my mind the emotions the passenger felt.  If I imagine myself sitting in a train and seeing 
exactly what the passenger sees, then I too begin to feel in the pit of my stomach his reluctance at leaving his 
world of the station behind, because I've felt similar things in the past in looking through the windows of 
trains.  I can internalize the disorienting feeling of seeing crazy passengers moving their feet but only standing 
still and then starting to lose ground.  By telling me what I am "seeing," Nabokov has recreated in me the fic-
tional passenger's emotions in leaving the train station! 
But I also know that what I am "seeing" through the eyes of this passenger is a gross misinterpretation of 
reality.  The people on the platform are not moving their feet while lurching backward as the platform recedes 
underneath them into the void.  They are actually walking in the direction of the train, and it is the train that is 
moving, not the platform. 
Curious how at one and the same time I internalize the emotions of the passenger and yet distance myself 
from his interpretation of reality.  Maybe Nabokov wanted me to locate my feelings somewhere in the nether-
world between the existential despair of the passenger and the cold reality of the normal way I should perceive 
a train station through the window of a moving train. 
Clearly the foregoing interpretation assumes a normal and reasonable reader—one whose 
thought processes are familiar to us.  Suppose instead we have a very strange reader—a reader from 
the galaxy Antipodes.  Assume her home planet resembles ours, except that everyone there includ-




moves backwards.  If she read the text, it would seem to her like a perfectly proper reporting of 
events.  All Nabokov's careful work would be wasted on her.  Yet isn't her interpretation as valid as 
ours? [FN32] 
In one sense, the Antipodean has simply excluded herself from the category of people who 
would be interested in Nabokov's novel.  She is like the reader who found it to be too "artsy," except 
that in her case she thinks it is not artistic enough.  Nabokov presumably was not writing the book 
for either of these types of reader. 
 [pg573] But this is not to say that the paragraph cannot be reformulated for an Antipodean au-
dience.  If Nabokov had lived on that planet, he presumably would have started his book from the 
point of view of a passenger seated on a train who believes that the train is moving and the station is 
standing still.  That might strike his audience as very interesting.  The situation would recall the 
British witticism, "Does Oxford stop at this train?" The Antipodeans presumably would fail to see 
any humor in that remark.  They might, however, laugh if someone asked, "Does this train stop at 
Oxford?" [FN33] 
Suppose you are a bookseller trying to sell the actual Nabokov novel (that is, the earth-version) 
to the Antipodeans.  You could explain to them that the passenger on the train in the Nabokov novel 
is deliberately misinterpreting reality.  Yet the Antipodeans might think you are crazy—the 
Nabokov text to them exactly describes mundane reality. [FN34] Can we appeal to Einstein's theory 
of relativity in explaining our interpretation of reality to the Antipodeans? 
In a 1918 dialogue—which could have inspired Nabokov's opening paragraph [FN35]—Einstein 
contrasts relativity with "common sense": 
The uniformly traveling train could just as well be regarded as "at rest," and the rails along with the entire 
region as "moving uniformly." Will the "common sense" of the locomotive engineer admit this? He will object 
that it is after all not the region which he has to continually heat and grease, but the locomotive, and that con-
sequently it must be the latter in whose motion the effect of his work may be seen.[FN36] 
 
[pg574] But Einstein goes on to show that this "common sense" view is merely convenient, and 
not necessary in principle.  He asks us to imagine the earth as falling freely in a gravitational field, 
while the train is prevented from falling freely by the friction exerted by its wheels against the track. 
[FN37] Specifically, we can imagine that Nabokov's station is indeed moving away from the pas-
senger in the train, and that the train would move along with the station but for the braking action of 
the train's wheels, whose rotational motion restrains the train from falling backwards at the same 
speed as the rest of the station.  In Einstein's view, this is exactly equivalent to regarding the train as 
moving.  The engineer heats and greases the locomotive to increase the friction between locomotive 
and track, thus increasing the speed at which the station falls away from the train.  Presumably, Ein-
stein would not regard the Antipodeans in my imaginary example as having a strange view of real-
ity, but rather would recognize their view as fully equivalent in every physical respect to our own. 
If we were to internalize fully Einstein's theory of relativity, so that we would routinely view the 
motion of trains as, interchangeably and alternatively, either the motion of trains or the motion of 
stations, then Nabokov's image would lose much of its effect upon us.  The artistic force of 
Nabokov's image depends upon the fact that we normally and usually do not interpret what we see 
through a train's window as the station starting to move backward.  Professor Fish might say that 




happen to be immersed—which, [pg575] at present, is one in which we do not carry around in our 
heads either the Antipodean interpretation of motion or the Einsteinian equivalence interpretation. 
But what is this claim other than that a good author makes a calculated guess as to the interpre-
tive community of the future readership of his novel and writes accordingly?  One can hardly doubt 
that Nabokov started his novel with the paragraph quoted above because he consciously or subcon-
sciously counted on the fact that most of his readers belong to a conventional interpretive commu-
nity and not an Antipodean or Einsteinian one.  And if they were to become Einsteinians in the dis-
tant future, he may well have calculated that by then he would not be around to lament the decline 
in royalties. 
Unlike the sending of a coded message, where the sender must previously have alerted the re-
ceiver to the code, I am claiming that Nabokov's opening paragraph itself assumes the existence of a 
decoder in the minds of his readers.  The code is the common view that earthlings (non-
Antipodeans) who are nonphysicists (non-Einsteinians) carry around in their heads—a code which 
says that trains move and stations stand still.  Because some possible readers (Einsteinians, Antipo-
deans) do not have that mental code, we can guess that the author would not go over well with such 
readers—that indeed they would be unable to decipher his message.  In military terms, they would 
simply lack a decoding device. 
Another way of saying that the opening paragraph contains a coded message is to say that it is 
theory-dependent.  Nabokov apparently counted on a theory of interpretation—one inside the 
reader's mind—that enabled him to produce an artistic effect in the reader by the literalness of the 
passenger's description of the scene through the train window.  If some readers (Antipodeans or 
Einsteinians for example) do not adhere to that theory, then the force of the opening paragraph will 
largely be lost on them. 
 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF INFERRING INTENT 
The foregoing, however, seems distinctly anti-Fishian.  If I were postulating some kind of inten-
tional strategy on the part of the author Nabokov purely on the basis of the text that he has written, 
Fish would surely object that I cannot possibly discern the author's intent from the text alone.  In a 
standard example, how can we possibly know anything at all about the original intent of the framers 
of the [pg576] Constitution from reading the text of the Constitution, or any other texts for that mat-
ter—including texts containing all recorded deliberations and contemporary writings of the framers? 
Let me first clear away one nonstarter in the question just raised.  No one can ever know with 
certainty what any author's intention or strategy was. [FN38] Indeed, Marvin Minsky (an authority 
on artificial intelligence) might say that even the author cannot know.[FN39] In the Nabokov exam-
ple, I was only invoking probabilities.  It is more probable than not that Nabokov [FN40] wrote for 
an interpretive community that typically viewed trains as moving and stations as standing still. 
[FN41] In everything that follows, I also make probabilistic and not certainty statements. [FN42] 
Thus, putting this point aside, I can join issue with Professor Fish on more realistic turf. 
 [pg577] The question, then, is whether in some cases we can posit theory-dependency on the 
part of the message-sender (such as the legislature in sending a statute out into the world).  Perhaps 
the most efficient way I can deal with this issue is to recount some events that helped unfold the is-




Vladimir Nabokov was in his penultimate year of teaching at Cornell [FN43] when I had the 
good fortune to enroll in his class in modern literature.  A short story of Kafka's struck me as an al-
legory about Christ, and so I asked Professor Nabokov after class whether it was supposed to be an 
allegory about Christ. 
"No, No!" he answered in his gentle basso tones.  "That's the wrong question!  You don't ask 
what the text is supposed to be!  The text is not supposed to be anything—other than a text, of 
course.  You should ask instead what the text means." 
"But if I ask you what it means," I replied, "you'll say that it means whatever the author intended 
it to mean." 
"Precisely right." 
"All right, Mr. Nabokov," I said, "did Kafka intend it to be an allegory?" 
"Aha," Nabokov replied, "now that you've correctly stated the question, your answer will be 
found in the text.  Go back to the text and re-read it!" 
This conversation encapsulated a duality that seemed to flow through Nabokov's entire course.  
On the one hand, he insisted that the "good reader" (that is, the sort of reader he wanted his students 
to become) reads a work of literature as a conversation between author and reader. [FN44] Hence, 
all that counts in interpreting a book is the intention of the author, conveyed through the conversa-
tion between author and reader.  On the other hand, Nabokov insisted that nothing outside the four 
corners of the book could conceivably be relevant to [pg578] the task of determining the author's 
intention.  Even a definitive biography[FN45] of the author could be more misleading than informa-
tive about what the author intended.  If we discovered, for example, that Flaubert patterned Madame 
Bovary after a woman of his acquaintance, any knowledge that we could gather about that real 
woman would just as likely as not mislead us in our interpretation of Madame Bovary. [FN46] The 
real world, including the real world of the author, cannot tell us how to resolve ambiguities in the 
text or pour meaning into any words or images that the author conjures up.  The author is, after all, 
engaging in a process of artifice.  The author is writing fiction.[FN47] 
But if we are to determine the intent of the author by reading a text and yet are precluded from 
looking anywhere other than the text to discern that intent, why talk about the intent of the author at 
all?[FN48] Why doesn't Nabokov's position reduce simply to saying that the text [pg579] itself de-
termines how we are to interpret it—a position that would appear to be the exact antithesis of 
Fish's? 
I received a possible answer to that question in a conversation I had with Professor Ernest 
Brown in law school two years later.  I did not have the good fortune to take his course.  (In those 
days students had very little choice in course selection and none in choosing professors.) I was writ-
ing a note on the taxation of collapsible corporations and caught up with Professor Brown in the 
hallways between classes.  As we walked together I asked him what materials I should consult to 
interpret the intent of Congress in writing the section of the Internal Revenue Code on collapsible 
corporations. 
Professor Brown's answer, at first, was very Nabokovian: "The best evidence of Congress's in-
tent is what they said in the particular statute you're construing." 
"Yes, Ernie, I know," I replied, "but the words of the statute don't seem to add up to any coher-




"But what you're missing," he said, "is the fact that Congress intended to levy the tax according 
to the words of the statute." 
Professor Brown's remark (as had Nabokov's) sent me back to the drawing board for days of fu-
rious thought.  The Brownian position was worlds apart from the Nabokovian position, even though 
superficially they seemed to be similar.  Nabokov would never have said that Kafka's intention was 
nothing other than the words he wrote.  Kafka, according to Nabokov (as I interpreted Nabokov), 
did not write books of words; he wrote books that had meaning expressed in words. [FN49] But 
then, I thought, maybe the difference between Nabokov [pg580] and Brown is the difference be-
tween literature and law. [FN50] The law, after all, is a very practical affair; literature, in contrast, is 
otherworldly.  Nabokov always said that literature is artifice, and that the world of the novel is a 
probable world somewhat askew of the real world that we know. [FN51] On the other hand, in the 
real world of law and legislation, there are real legislators who have real meanings that they want to 
pour into nonfictional statutes.  With Professor Brown I was back on solid ground, construing a 
highly real (and from a literary standpoint intolerably boring) section of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Then a third professor entered the picture who turned out to have the decisive influence on my 
decision to teach law.  Lon Fuller's jurisprudence made it impossible for me to draw a facile distinc-
tion between literature and law and thus to avoid the problem caused by the apparent conflict be-
tween Nabokov and Brown.  For Fuller's view [pg581] of textual interpretation of statutes turned 
out to be very close to Nabokov's, even though Fuller was dealing with legal texts.  According to 
Fuller, statutes are enacted by legislatures in order to manage the affairs of society with some de-
gree of general rationality.  When we read a statute, we have to interpret it in light of this assumed 
reasonable purpose. [FN52] Fuller's best example, I think, is in his "Case of the Speluncean Explor-
ers." There he imagines a statute with the word "not" inserted in a place that renders meaningless 
the purpose of the statute: 
[I]n Fehler v. Neegas there was before this Court for construction a statute in which the word "not" had 
plainly been transposed from its intended position in the final and most crucial section of the act.  This transpo-
sition was contained in all the successive drafts of the act, where it was apparently overlooked by the draftsmen 
and sponsors of the legislation.  No one was able to prove how the error came about, yet it was apparent that, 
taking account of the contents of the statute as a whole, an error had been made, since a literal reading of the 
final clause rendered it inconsistent with everything that had gone before and with the object of the enactment 
as stated in its preamble.  This Court refused to accept a literal interpretation of the statute, and in effect recti-
fied its language by reading the word "not" into the place where it was evidently intended to go. [FN53] 
If we choose to ignore the word "not"—no matter how persuasive the reason we can adduce for 
our choice—we must concede that we cannot interpret the intent of Congress solely according to the 
words Congress used. 
So Fuller and Nabokov disagreed sharply with Brown.  Then what was Brown telling me?  He 
could not have been unaware of the Nabokov-Fuller view.  I concluded that Brown was carrying 
that view a logical step further in his conversation with me about taxation.  What in essence he must 
have been saying to me is as follows: Congress [pg582] has become frustrated in watching the 
courts second-guess the tax statutes.  No matter what Congress intended, the courts were able to 
find some intent or purpose in the statutes that, in particular cases, led to results at variance with 
what Congress intended.  The problem for Congress then was to ensure that its own intent would be 
given effect, and not some judicially presumed—but false—intent. [FN54] The strategy Congress 
came up with, at least in the tax area, was to say—as Brown interpreted Congress to say—that its 




apply the words, whatever they are.  If the word "not" is in the statute and it looks absurd, apply it 
anyway.  (This is like saying "drop everything and come running—and I really mean it!") At least, 
according to Brown, in Congress's considered judgment more cases will more likely be decided ac-
cording to Congress's real intent if the courts simply "apply" the words than if the courts try to fig-
ure out what intent Congress really had.  Congress, in brief, made a cost-effective calculation: better 
to have the courts apply the words, no matter where the words might lead, than to have the courts 
second-guess Congress by resorting to some sort of mystical intent-divination. [FN55] 
Now, maybe this account of what Congress really intended is correct.  Maybe Brown was not, 
as it first appeared, giving me a principle of statutory interpretation ("The intent is to legislate ac-
cording to the words"), but rather opening up for me a way of dealing with tax codes.  The way to 
deal with a tax code is a matter of rhetoric: to argue to a court (or in a law journal) that there is no 
independent reality to a collapsible corporation, but rather than if a given set of paper transactions 
corresponds to the words Congress used in defining and taxing what Congress defined as a collapsi-
ble corporation, then for tax purposes that set of paper transactions amounts to a collapsible corpo-
ration.  And if one needs more to accompany this highly positivistic account of what is going on in 
the collapsible corporations [pg583] section of the tax code, one simply tells the story about the 
continuing battle between Congress and the courts over the intent of Congress and Congress's de-
termination to end the fight by instructing the courts that it forevermore intends to levy the tax ac-
cording to the words of the statute. 
Why only tax codes?  Because it may not be so important whether absurd taxes are levied.  
Congress can always pass a private bill to reimburse a taxpayer who was the victim of a statute that 
wrongly contained the word "not," and Congress can always amend the statute and take the word 
"not" out.  Furthermore, tax distinctions are often themselves intrinsically arbitrary, the result of 
legislative compromises that have little to do with the real word (e.g., the real world does not tell us 
how to spot a difference between regular income and capital gains).  As a result, a court might be 
unable to determine whether the word "not" was purposefully or inadvertently omitted from the 
statute.  Even legislators, if polled, might disagree sharply on this issue.  The net result of these con-
siderations is that Brown's literal approach may be the most cost-effective in the area of taxation: if 
some people are unfairly taxed no great harm is done—it is not like losing the baby in the well.  But 
in other legislation, such as criminal law, the positivist-literalist interpretation of intent could lead to 
real and sometimes irreversible human losses, and therefore those statutes might have to be read as 
Nabokov and Fuller would read them. 
For a while, I was content with the dichotomy between tax legislation ("tax according to the 
words") and other legislation ("apply according to the meaning").  But it soon dawned on me that 
this was no better than the other dichotomy that I had lived with for a while but eventually dis-
carded—that between law and literature.  Why should there be a fundamental difference between 
kinds of legislation, such as between a complex tax code and a simpler criminal code?  And if there 
is no such difference, must I use Brown's approach in interpreting all the areas of law, including 
criminal law?  Everything I knew about law—especially the commonsense things I had not quite 
discarded even in law school—counseled against such an approach.  Following such an approach 
could entail sending someone to jail because the word "not" was mistakenly included in the statute.  
I knew that literal readings and the whole formalist approach to the law were one of the biggest 
problems about law.  The legal system perpetuates a great deal of injustice by adhering to formalism 
and literalism [pg584] and insisting upon what are pejoratively called "lawyers' technicalities." 




formalism is all right for tax codes but not for other areas of law.  Rather, I would have to argue—
although it was the much harder argument to make—that even tax codes cannot be interpreted ac-
cording to the words. [FN56] 
The conclusion I now felt I had to defend was that Brown's theory was unworkable even for tax 
codes.  His theory must be shown to fail to achieve the purpose that Congress had in mind in the 
cautionary tale of the battle of interpretation between Congress and the courts.  At the very most it 
gives us what Fish tells us is all that theories of interpretation can give us—a plausible rhetoric.   
[FN57] Thus my conclusion.  But what support could I give it? 
Support cannot be found if we look solely to tax codes or cases that construe tax codes.  The 
evidence we must look to is tax avoidance.  That evidence is not readily available in law books, be-
cause the better the tax-avoidance lawyer, the less likely the scheme will be contested by the gov-
ernment.  Yet I did discover over the years that what actually happens as a consequence of adhering 
to Brown's view is that the tax planners will figure out ways to structure paper transactions—
including the invention of corporations and other entities solely for tax avoidance—that literally 
step by step escape every trap-word in a statutory provision and thereby avoid being captured by the 
statute. [FN58] 
But that strategy inevitably generates the form-substance problem.  All tax planners will comply 
exactly with the form of the statute so as [pg585] to avoid falling within any category to which the 
higher tax applies.  [FN59] No matter how ingenious or how detailed Congress might be in writing 
the statute, and no matter how often the statute is revised to plug loopholes, [FN60] tax planners 
enjoy enough degrees of freedom to comply exactly with Congress's formal structure and yet avoid 
paying the higher tax (or in some cases, avoid paying any tax at all).[FN61] In an earlier article I 
contended that legal rules in general (including, of course, tax codes), to the extent that they are 
construed as literal commands or propositions, obey a kind of second law of thermodynamics—they 
deteriorate with age in the sense that they become increasingly uncertain in meaning and increas-
ingly unable to guide [pg586] conduct as they were intended to do.[FN62] 
Of course, with every action there is a reaction.  To the extent that Brown's literalist theory of 
tax interpretation is followed and wealthy individuals become increasingly able to avoid paying tax, 
sooner or later the courts must depart from the literalist theory.  And so they did, starting with 
Gregory v. Helvering in 1935[FN63] and continuing with inevitably increasing frequency down to 
the present, by inventing and applying the "business purpose rule," which is not itself in the tax 
code.  They hold that paper transactions that comply with the letter of the tax code but lack an inde-
pendent business purpose shall not be given a tax-avoidance effect. [FN64] No matter how exact the 
correlation between the words of the statute and what the taxpayer does, the intent of Congress 
could not possibly have been—according to the courts—to let the taxpayer avoid paying the tax 
merely because the taxpayer was ingenious enough to comply exactly with the words of the statute.  
Hence Brown's theory is refuted, and we are back to Nabokov and Fuller—and to an extent Fish.  
No set of words can in themselves do the "law job," and no number of amendments or explanatory 
paragraphs or loophole-plugging or preamble-writing can save the situation, because all of the latter 
are simply examples of more words chasing the original words.  (And, to boot, the "business pur-
pose" theory cannot do the job, either, [FN65] nor can the practice of [pg587] "recharacterizations" 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. [FN66]) 
The foregoing is not to say that Brown was wrong.  On the contrary, he may very well have 




might say, the best current way of "presenting" what Congress "intended." [FN67] But his theory 
must and does fail in the highly ramified area of taxation, and hence should fail in all other areas of 
legislation as well. [FN68] Yet the failures are always and only failures of our own expectation.  We 
never should have expected that a legislature could force a single interpretation of its commands 
upon any addressee.  If we change our expectation—if instead we hope for a reduction in the de-
grees of freedom the addressee believes are available to him in interpreting a statute—we may make 
a little progress. 
 
IV.  RADICAL INTERPRETATION 
The examples I used in the previous section share the feature of presenting radical challenges to 
what we might call the ordinary, reasonable, expected interpretation of statutes.  Curiously, radi-
cally strange interpretations of any message may be more difficult to guard against than interpreta-
tions that only vary slightly from the expected interpretation.  (And certainly, as Professor Kelman 
observes, the extreme and excessive cases have "critical" rhetorical power. [FN69] These are the 
cases that tend to show up in law-school class discussions and [pg588] in law review arti-
cles.[FN70]) 
Consider some of Dworkin's bedrock examples of texts that he claims cannot possibly be misin-
terpreted except if someone is deliberately perverse.  Stating the precise opposite of the position I've 
taken in the preceding paragraph, Dworkin writes in Law's Empire: 
You and I can sensibly discuss how many books I have on my shelf, for example, only if we both agree, at 
least roughly, about what a book is.  We can disagree over the borderline cases.  I may call something a slim 
book that you would call a pamphlet.  But we cannot disagree over what I called pivotal cases.  If you do not 
count my copy of Moby-Dick as a book because in your view novels are not books, any disagreement is bound 
to be senseless. [FN71] 
Yet here are some ways, not all of which are necessarily perverse, in which I can refuse to count 
Dworkin's copy of Moby-Dick as a book—ways that are quite unlike the somewhat simpleminded 
position ("novels are not books") that he puts in the mouth of the reader: 
1.  Dworkin has simply solved one problem by creating a similar problem of equal difficulty.  
He presupposes that "we both agree, at least roughly, about what a book is." But what does he mean 
by "roughly"?  Dworkin simply shifts his question about "books" to an identical question about 
"roughly." 
2.  Moreover, Dworkin begs the question he asks.  If we agree about what a book is, then his 
conclusion follows that we agree—but it is an empty tautology. 
3.  Perhaps Dworkin feels we can disagree about what it means to count as a book.  But then we 
are faced with innumerable and conflicting methods of "counting." For example, Dworkin might 
say there are five books on his shelf and I might say there are 101.  If he is using numerals in the 
decimal system and I am using numerals in the binary system, we can be referring to the same items 
on the shelf. 
4.  Suppose Dworkin says there are five books on his shelf and I say there are forty-three.  He 
points to the items on his shelf and asks me if there are any that I "see" there that he doesn't see, and 
I say no.  He asks me if I am using numbers to any base other than the decimal [pg589] base, and I 




which is the Old Testament, and show him that it contains thirty-nine books.  That plus the other 
books on his shelf adds up to forty-three. 
5.  The term "book" is subject to an unspecifiable number of interpretations. [FN72] 
6.  Dworkin's copy of Moby-Dick, for all we know, might be an audio tape. 
7.  It might be a file on his computer's hard drive. 
8.  It might be the "classic comic" version of Moby-Dick. 
9.  Why should I assume that Dworkin's copy of Moby-Dick is a copy of a book with that title?  
Maybe it is only a copy of the title "Moby-Dick." Thus his "copy" of "Moby-Dick" might be two 
hyphenated words that are printed on a piece of paper (the words "Moby-Dick"). 
10.  I could argue that, if a novel is a book, then Moby-Dick isn't a novel.  (Moby-Dick is a mo-
rality play, with many dialogue scenes, lengthy stage directions, and background information in the 
form of newspaper clippings and assorted commentary.) 
Recently in a discussion of this same topic a law professor picked up a book, held it in his 
hands, and asked me whether I could call what he was holding a "globe." I replied, "Yes, if this 
were an audience of mathematicians, or if you're willing to go along with math-talk.  What you're 
holding is the topological equivalent of a sphere or globe." [FN73] 
Or consider Dworkin's claim that no one who regards Hamlet as a forceful man of action could 
possibly have interpreted the play correctly. [FN74] Stanley Fish replies: 
 [pg590] The reason that the example of Hamlet as a forceful-man-of-action seems such a good one to 
Dworkin is that Hamlet's indecisiveness has been part of the interpretive tradition for so long that it is almost 
proverbial. . . .  [I]t is not impossible (although neither is it inevitable) that there could come a time when be-
cause of an argument successfully prosecuted—perhaps one in which Hamlet is from the very first executing a 
predetermined plan—the hero of Shakespeare's play will be regarded as the very type of decisiveness. [FN75] 
Even in the present interpretive climate I think one could argue, contrary to Dworkin, that Ham-
let was only portraying what it would be like to be indecisive.  My argument quickly sketched is as 
follows: Hamlet is really a play about a play.  The lead actor is presenting a masterly performance 
of acting the role of a prince in Denmark, a prince given to highly theatrical declamations that run 
the thespian gamut between sanity and madness, between reality and ghosts, between ontological 
philosophy and mundane existence.  The lurid and overblown drama of Shakespeare's lines suggests 
that we are not to take them as a depiction of something that happened in Denmark but rather as an 
extended audition of acting ability in a Danish setting.  There is even a tip-off that Hamlet is a play 
about a play: the "play within a play" of Act III, Scene 2—a wholly overblown quasi-dramatic ren-
dering of the murder of Duke Gonzago, preceded by Hamlet's instructions to the players about the 
art of acting. [FN76] In brief, my argument is that Hamlet is a play about acting in a play. 
Indeed, a totally radical interpretive theory can be built upon this one.  Were Dworkin further to 
contend in accordance with received wisdom that Hamlet is a tragedy, I might attempt to defend as 
follows the proposition—which as far as I know has never been asserted—that it is a high comedy.  
I contend that the play about a play that I have just described—that is, the "play" that we see on the 
stage—is a [pg591] comedy; it's only the play that is being auditioned that is a tragedy.  We are see-
ing a comedy about actors acting out a tragedy. [FN77] Shakespeare may have been three centuries 
ahead of his time as a humorist; only recently have we been seeing the kind of black humor (from 




joke is being played in a theater; the joke is that the audience at first thinks it is seeing a very 
"heavy" tragedy; but only when it recognizes that it is "too much," that the lines are written in 
"black letter" so to speak, that the "tragedy" is being performed as a tour-de-force by the actor who 
plays Hamlet, does the vast scope of Shakespeare's humorous conceit become comprehensible.  
Moreover, there was method in Shakespeare's comic madness—only such a unique play about a 
play can demand acting ability that can truly be called consummate, for the actors must simultane-
ously be believable within the play that they are playing, while also (with straight faces) be believ-
able as actors dressed up in courtly raiment [pg592] declaiming the ponderously immortal lines of 
that play within a play. [FN79] Although I've never seen Hamlet presented this way, I can imag-
ine—or fantasize—that it may have been performed as a high comedy to laughing audiences at the 
Globe Theater during Shakespeare's time—to audiences that were far more "knowing" about Shake-
speare's actual "intent" than theatergoers have been since then. 
Whether or not my reinterpretation of Hamlet is off-the-wall, my point has been to prove—
using Dworkin's own examples—that radical reinterpretations are always possible. [FN80] Even as 
lengthy a play as Hamlet can be interpreted either as a tragedy or as a comedy.  Minor variations in 
interpretation—consider ten actors playing Hamlet in ten productions, all of them with varying de-
grees of skill in portraying an indecisive prince of Denmark—are more easily compared and rated 
against one another.  A theater critic can say that the third actor was better than the fifth, but only 
because she has a mind-set that accepts a minor range of variability in interpreting a set vision of 
the play—a vision of an indecisive prince.  Critical "disagreement" over the borderline cases is 
weak tea.  We may disagree, we may argue, we may debate, but only because we are standing close 
to each other on common ground.  This is not the profound kind of disagreement I imagine you had 
with me when I tried to argue in the previous paragraph that Hamlet is really a comedy. 
I have also tried to show, by these examples, that if the audience already has a certain mind-set, 
the meaning of the message is less susceptible to radical reinterpretation.[FN81] Thus, if audiences 
come into the [pg593] theater expecting another Hamlet-is-an-indecisive-fellow performance, that is 
how they most likely will interpret and critically evaluate the performance that they see.  They are 
quite likely in the present interpretive context to fail to understand what the actor playing Hamlet is 
doing if he were to present my "play about a play" interpretation.  They might very well miss the 
joke entirely.  On the other hand, if someday an audience comes into the theater expecting to see a 
comic play about a tragic play—that is, when my radical reinterpretation becomes commonplace   
]FN82]—that audience might indeed consider a "straight" performance of Hamlet as an indecisive 
prince a mediocre piece of acting. 
 
V.  JURISPRUDENCE AS AUDIENCE-PREPARATION 
Perhaps the most difficult problems of audience pre-selection and preparation are not to be 
found in literature but rather in jurisprudence.  Legislators (and framers of constitutions) have an 
unlimited number of words at their disposal, but they can use them only once, and what they say has 
significant consequences.  A statute once enacted lays down the law until it is amended; and even if 
it is amended, the time gap between the original enactment and the amendment is governed by the 
once-only choice of words that the legislature passed.[FN83] Hence the problem is to precondition 
the audience so that the statutes will fall on friendly ears ("friendly" in the sense of likely to adhere 
to the intent of the legislators who enacted [pg594] the statute). [FN84] I contend that jurisprudence 




Jurisprudence consists of theories of interpretation of law: meta-interpretive theories that are 
supposed to stand apart from any particular body of law.  A great deal of the effort that has gone 
into jurisprudence has been devoted to attempts to define "law." Many pragmatic attorneys and le-
gal scholars dismiss jurisprudence on just this ground: all the theories seem to depend on how law is 
defined.  Yet legal philosophers are acutely aware of this pragmatic dismissal of jurisprudence and 
thus strive to match their definitions as closely as possible to how lawyers and nonjurisprudential 
scholars ordinarily use the term "law." For the real aim of jurisprudence is not to define law, but to 
indicate the proper sources for judicial decisionmaking.  Positivists, who want to constrain judicial 
decisionmaking, say that legislative commands constitute "law," and accordingly emphasize statutes 
as the only legitimate source for judicial decisions and deemphasize "common law" and custom. 
[FN85] Naturalists reverse these emphases because they are more comfortable in expanding the 
ambit of judicial decisionmaking. [FN86] 
Jurisprudential theories can play a powerful rhetorical role in legal argument.  In most cases, a 
statute will apparently favor one side [pg595] more than the other.  If the statute seems to favor the 
plaintiff, then the plaintiff will be helped rhetorically if she uses legal positivism in the construction 
of her arguments.  In the same case, the defendant will be helped rhetorically if he uses natural law 
in the construction of his arguments.  The justification I give to my Jurisprudence classes for study-
ing a subject that is not on the multistate bar exam is that knowledge of jurisprudential theories will 
help lawyers in selecting and constructing legal arguments on any side of any case, and in under-
standing and refuting arguments of opposing counsel. 
Yet writers of legal philosophy would probably say that this pragmatic use of jurisprudence is at 
best a by-product of their theories.  The professed aim of their theories is to get at the truth of what 
law is.  Any positivist believes that positivism, with appropriate amendments, is true and naturalism 
is false; naturalists believe the opposite.  Both positivists and naturalists believe in interpretation as 
fervently as Stanley Fish disbelieves in it. 
There is a curious utility in legal theorists believing that their jurisprudential theories are true 
rather than just rhetorical; such a belief makes the theorists better rhetoricians.  For it is invariably 
more persuasive to argue that something "is" the case rather than to argue that something "ought to 
be" the case.  The conflating of "is" and "ought" [FN87] has resonated throughout natural-law the-
ory as a peculiarly effective form of rhetoric. [FN88] 
The position I want to take is that if an audience believes a given jurisprudential theory, that au-
dience has forfeited a few of its degrees of interpretive freedom, and that if the legislature knows 
this fact about its audience, it may be able to use jurisprudence to its advantage. 
Let us consider the classic jurisprudential example invented in 1958 by H. L. A. Hart in his de-
bate with Fuller—a statute that forbids you [pg596] to take a vehicle into a public park. [FN89] Hart 
said that this statute, like any statute, has a "core" message: because an automobile is clearly a vehi-
cle, you cannot take one into the park.[FN90] Hart's insistence that one can tease a core meaning out 
of the word "vehicle" has led some commentators to derive half-truths from the Hart-Fuller debate: 
every post-Realist law student ought to know that when the town council declares that there shall be no vehi-
cles in the park, it becomes no easier to tell whether it meant to bar wheelchairs, bikes, or a statue of a general in 
his jeep if we simply think harder about what the word vehicle means. [FN91] 
This interpretation is accurate only insofar as its conclusion (that to "think harder" about the 




Fuller exchange.  For one thing, Hart never claimed that the penumbral cases, such as wheelchairs 
or bikes, could be derived from the word "vehicle"; he only made that claim as to core instances.  
The most he claimed with respect to penumbral applications of the statute was that a court has un-
fettered discretion in a case of first impression to include or exclude such applications within the 
statute. [FN92] Subsequent courts would lack such discretion only because of the rule of stare de-
cisis.  For another thing, Fuller never claimed that a statue of a general in a jeep was or was not a 
penumbral instance like wheelchairs or bikes.  Fuller's far more profound invention deserves quota-
tion: 
What would Professor Hart say if some local patriots wanted to mount on a pedestal in the park a truck 
used in World War II, while other citizens, regarding the proposed memorial as an eyesore, support their stand 
by the "no vehicle" rule?  Does this truck, in perfect working order, fall within the core or the penumbra? 
[FN93] 
 [pg597] To some extent the failure of some commentators to understand Fuller's point was due 
to the inaccurate way Fuller himself put the question.  He should not have asked whether the truck 
falls within the core or the penumbra.  The fact is that Fuller invented a Godelian undecidable 
proposition precisely within Hart's "core" formula.  Godel, it will be recalled, proved that there are 
some mathematical propositions (actually, an infinity of them) that can neither be proved nor dis-
proved within a mathematical system of at least enough complexity as to include ordinary arithme-
tic. [FN94] Any existing language qualifies as a system of at least as much complexity as ordinary 
arithmetic, and hence Godel's proof applies to legal, textual, and linguistic demonstrations. [FN95] 
Fuller's example of the truck demonstrates the undecidability of the case (between local patriots and 
other citizens) given an indisputable core-instance "vehicle." [FN96] In the post-Fish era, [pg598] 
we can reinterpret Fuller's conclusion to be the following: what Hart thought was non-problematic 
(the core idea of a "vehicle") turns out [pg599] to be a mini-theory (a theory about vehicleness), and 
that mini-theory, like all theories, is subject to radical reinterpretation.  In short, Fuller punctured 
the theory balloon thirty years ago.[FN97] 
The foregoing analysis reduces Hart's positivistic core-penumbra distinction to two proposi-
tions: (a) what we think of as falling within the core of the statute could be subject to radical rein-
terpretation,  [FN98] and (b) what we think of as falling within the penumbra [FN99] is the typical 
"arguable" case (even if not solvable by staring at the word "vehicle" [FN100]).  I contend that, as 
to (a), no interpretive theory of what constitutes the core can help us.  But as to (b), we can dispute 
whether any of the following (a list I made up a while ago) should or should not come within the 
statute: "Sherman tanks, flying saucers that land within the park, hydrofoils, motorized play-pens, 
or visitors from outer space who have wheels instead of legs for their personal locomotion [and 
drink gasoline]." [FN101] Not to mention, of course, the usual penumbral cases: bicycles, tricycles, 
scooters, skateboards, baby carriages, and motorized wheelchairs. 
Because these penumbral cases are disputable (not as radically disputable as the core cases, con-
trary to what Dworkin says  [FN102]), it may [pg600] make a difference whether the interpreter is a 
positivist or a naturalist as to how many of these examples will seem to him to be barred by the 
statute.  And that indeed is my thesis in this Part.  I suggest that it is simply more likely that a posi-
tivist guard on duty at the entrance to the park (or a court reviewing the guard's determinations) will 
bar more of the foregoing penumbral cases—and of all other imaginable penumbral cases—than 




This result accords with commonplace experience.  We are all familiar with literal-minded offi-
cers or bureaucrats.  These are the persons who spot something that looks like a vehicle and 
promptly bar it from the park.  They will often do very unreasonable things.  They might for in-
stance bar an ambulance, a fire truck, [FN103] or a police car [FN104] from entering the park.  
They will certainly be more likely to [pg601] bar bicycles, scooters, and motorized wheelchairs.  
They make these decisions because they have absorbed positivist jurisprudential theory. [FN105] 
If guards, police officers, or lower courts are known to have absorbed positivist theory, a legis-
lature could exploit this fact in order to reduce the degrees of interpretive freedom its statutes will 
encounter.  Using the word "vehicle" will thus cut a wider swath with respect to the penumbral 
cases that I have listed.  A legislature bent upon excluding as many of those penumbral cases as 
possible will be well advised to use the word "vehicle" if it knows in advance that its most likely 
interpretive community will consist of positivist-minded guards and courts. 
But there are two important codicils to append to this thesis, lest it be radically misinterpreted.  
First, I am not claiming that the legislature will be better served by having positivist (or, alterna-
tively, naturalist) interpreters.  For instance, if the legislature has no intent to exclude ambulances, 
fire engines, and police cars from the park, then it may be ill-served by the "no vehicles" sign when 
that sign is interpreted by positivists.  If the legislature does decide to use the "no vehicles" sign and 
yet wants to allow fire engines and ambulances into the park, it will, as we have seen, be better 
served by guards and courts who are imbued with naturalist jurisprudential theory.  If, however, the 
legislature knows in advance that its interpretive community will consist mostly of positivists, and it 
still wants to load the odds in favor of ambulances and fire engines being allowed into the park, its 
best strategy would be to write those specific exceptions into the statute.  Of course, the inclusion of 
specific exceptions requires the legislature to have foreseen the panoply of desired exceptions in 
advance.  Such a list of exceptions will not do the entire job if the legislature has not also thought of 
groundskeepers' trucks and tractors.  A positivist guard will bar those from the park even though a 
heated argument will undoubtedly ensue between the guard and the caretaker, who will insist that 
"of course" he should be allowed into [pg602] the park to tend to the grounds.  But the guard will 
reply, "Since you're not one of the approved exceptions, you can turn your truck around and take up 
your gripe with the city council." (If the legislature added the abbreviation "etc." to the list of ap-
proved exceptions, the result might contribute to the mental destabilization of positivistic park 
guards.) 
My second codicil is that there is no a priori reason why positivists rather than naturalists will 
take a wider view of any given statute. [FN106] Consider a statute that says "no automobiles in the 
park." A naturalist guard is more likely than a positivist guard to interpret this statute as also barring 
trucks, campers, and motorcycles.[FN107] Although the positivist (but not the naturalist) would bar 
an automobile temporarily commandeered as an ambulance, on the whole the naturalist would take 
a more inclusive view of the statute's scope, reasoning that automobiles must have been barred for 
some legislative reason and hence that other automobile-like things should be barred if that inferred 
reason also applies to them. 
Hence, all I am claiming is that there will be a tendency toward varying breadths of interpreta-
tion depending upon the general jurisprudential theory of the interpretive community.  A legislature 
that knows in advance what that general jurisprudential theory is likely to be will have a slightly 
more precise way of communicating the message it wants to communicate than a legislature that is 




day, the legislature will be more effective in writing its statutes if it knows what this jurisprudence 
is and how to exploit it. [FN108] Indeed, if there is any jurisprudence among judges, or [pg603] 
even any theory of statutory interpretation among judges, legislators would be well advised to know 
what it is. 
 
CONCLUSION 
My thesis has thus been a modest one.  I do not claim for jurisprudence the role of ensuring 
faithful reception of the legislature's message, for that is impossible.  At best, jurisprudential theory 
only reduces the degrees of interpretive freedom, and then only probably, not necessarily.  Yet if 
that is all I have accomplished here as a positive matter, the more significant thesis of this Article is 
that all theories of statutory interpretation can only do that much and no more.  In this sense, as a 
negative claim opposing all formalistic theories of legislative interpretation, my thesis may disprove 
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[FN1 See S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?  (1980); Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish 
(and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk about Objectivity Anymore, in The Politics of In-
terpretation 287 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983); Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 Tex. L. 
Rev. 495 (1982); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 Tex. L. 
Rev. 551 (1982); Fish, Wrong Again, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 299 (1983) [hereinafter Wrong Again]; Fish, 
Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1773 (1987) [hereinafter Uses of Theory]; 
Fish, Still Wrong After All These Years, 6 Law & Phil.  401 (1987); Fish, Don't Know Much About 
the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97 Yale L.J. 777 (1988) [hereinafter Don't Know 
Much]; Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462 
(1987); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 473 (1984). 
[FN2 ]The counterstrategy is impossible if one accepts Gadamer's hermeneutics: the meaning of 
a text always surpasses its own author, because the author is himself imbedded in a historical mo-
ment within his interpretive tradition.  See H. Gadamer, Truth and Method 259 (2d ed.  1985).  For 
a delicate filigree on this theme (addressed to aesthetics but just as applicable to a statute or a judi-
cial precedent), see Gadamer, Aesthetics and Hermeneutics, in H. Gadamer, Philosophical Herme-
neutics 95 (D. Linge ed. 1976). 
[FN3] See Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151, 246-70 (1981). 
[FN4] And as such contained many defects of question-begging and reification—problems that 





[FN5] Professor Fish's position on "intention" is that "[t]here is only one way to read or interpret 
and that is the way of intention; but to read intentionally is not to be constrained relative to some 
other (non-existent) way of reading." Fish, Don't Know Much, supra note 1, at 778. 
[FN6] Indeed, positivism construes a judicial decision as legislative in nature; courts are consid-
ered to have been delegated a limited legislative competence in the penumbral areas of statutes.  For 
a discussion and references, see A. D'Amato, Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis 
of Law 118-41 (1984). 
[FN7] When I refer in this Article to statutory interpretation, I mean to include constitutional in-
terpretation as well. 
[FN8] See works by Stanley Fish, supra note 1, as well as his forthcoming book, S. Fish, Doing 
What Comes Naturally (1989). 
[FN9] For a good critique of recent attempts to formulate general principles of constitutional in-
terpretation, see Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982). 
[FN10] They sometimes believe they are following explicit rules even though they are aware of 
the existence of equally valid rules compelling the opposite interpretation!  Karl Llewellyn once 
published a revealing list of utterly contradictory rules of interpretation; one of those rules, or its 
opposite, will "justify" any desired interpretation.  See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appel-
late Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 
395, 401-06 (1950). 
[FN11] This issue recalls William James' famous question: Do we cry because we are sad, or are 
we sad because we cry?  See W. James, 2 The Principles of Psychology 449-50 (1890).  Although 
this was a heretical question when first asked, there now is empirical evidence that emotions are 
caused by feedback from physiological arousal, and that what we "think" about these emotions is in 
some sense an ex post facto rationalization.  See R. de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion 51-64 
(1987).  If this account is true of our innermost perceptions of ourselves, it is a fortiori true of the 
way our minds attach meaning to external phenomena such as texts. 
[FN12] See, e.g., Holton, 'What, precisely, is "thinking"?' Einstein's answer, in Einstein: A Cen-
tenary Volume 153, 159-60 (A. French ed. 1979).  An important step in Heisenberg's development 
of his uncertainty principle was a discussion he had with Einstein in 1926.  According to Rosenfeld, 
Heisenberg's "attempt at arguing that a good theory ought only to operate with observable quantities 
had elicited from Einstein the pointed retort, which had made a strong impression on him: 'Only the 
theory itself can decide what is and is not observable.'" Rosenfeld, Men and Ideas in the History of 
Atomic Theory, reprinted in Quantum Theory and Measurement 57, 58 (J. Wheeler & W. Zurek 
eds. 1983). 
[FN13] In his early writings and teaching, Professor Lon Fuller stressed the legislative "pur-
pose" in statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv.  
L. Rev. 616, 623-26 (1949). Later he became convinced that the legislature could not foresee how 
statutes would be interpreted: "The troublesome cases are in reality resolved not in advance by the 
legislator, but at the point of application.  This means that in applying the statute [forbidding 'vehi-
cles' in the public park] the judge or police sergeant must be guided not simply by its words but also 
by some conception of what is fit and proper to come into a park. . . ." L. Fuller, Anatomy of the 




"purpose" thesis and his later "point of application" antithesis.  I suggest that legislatures might not 
know how the statute will be interpreted, but might have an idea of the kinds of theories of interpre-
tation the judges or police sergeants are likely to have in mind when they are called upon to "apply" 
the statute. 
[FN14] For a good discussion which came out after I wrote the above, see W. Poundstone, 
Labyrinths of Reason 191-221 (1988). 
[FN15] For particularly good accounts of the European theatre, see A. Brown, Bodyguard of 
Lies (1975) and R. Jones, The Wizard War (1978).  A good general history of the Pacific theatre, 
using recently declassified materials, is J. Costello, The Pacific War (1981).  Of the spate of recent 
books about Pearl Harbor and Midway, a good firsthand account is E. Layton, "And I Was There" 
(1985).  I have yet to find a book that honestly recounts the extent to which American soldiers died 
at the hands of other American soldiers who—as the result of communications snafus—fired or 
dropped bombs upon them.  These episodes are still a sanitized part of military history, available 
only from personal, unwritten accounts of military field officers. 
[FN16] In the early days of the war, Japan sent their best and most experienced pilots on re-
peated missions.  These pilots were accustomed to communicating with each other and coordinating 
their flying patterns.  But after normal attrition, Japanese leaders discovered that the loss of their 
best pilots was too costly—air attacks were becoming noticeably less effective due to lack of coor-
dination and communication.  The policy then shifted to one of keeping their best pilots at home as 
trainers.  But again no amount of advance training could prepare inexperienced pilots to deal with 
the ambiguities of communication and coordination.  Finally, a mixed strategy (which had generally 
been employed by the United States from the very beginning) was adopted: send some experienced 
pilots out among the majority of inexperienced ones on any given mission, and keep some experi-
enced pilots at home as trainers. 
[FN17] For discussions of the role of cryptology in extraterrestrial communications, see Deav-
ours, Extraterrestrial Communication: A Cryptologic Perspective, in Extraterrestrials: Science and 
Alien Intelligence 201 (E. Regis ed. 1985); Freudenthal, Excerpts from LINCOS: Design of a Lan-
guage for Cosmic Intercourse, in Extraterrestrials: Science and Alien Intelligence 215. 
[FN18] For further discussion of the plaque, see C. Sagan, The Cosmic Connection 16-33 
(1973); Sagan, Sagan & Drake, A Message From Earth, 175 Science 881 (1972).  For a detailed de-
scription of the more extensive message (including recorded greetings and music) sent with the later 
Voyager probe, see C. Sagan, Murmurs of Earth (1978). 
[FN19] The message itself might be a binary radio message, but cryptologists could easily deci-
pher it if it is a direct encoding of the English language (in which any numerals can stand for any 
letter, so long as the numerals do not change in the course of the message).  Of course, this would 
not be a "secret code" in the sense I used in the text accompanying notes 14-16, supra. 
[FN20] This reasoning ultimately reduces to Quine's famous showing of the impossibility of a 
determinate "radical" translation, i.e., direct translation from an unrelated language without the aid 
of analogues arising from shared cultural elements.  W. Quine, Word and Object §§7-16 (1960).  
Quine concludes that radical translation is indeterminate for even the simplest segments of language 
because the behavior associated with that segment is equally consistent with two or more English 




translation could not proceed at all without the observation of associated behavior, which is impos-
sible in the example in the text. 
[FN21]  Of course, the extraterrestrials' interpreting our broadcasts with sufficient accuracy even 
to attempt to deceive us in our own language requires their being able to observe the behaviors and 
contexts associated with segments of our language.  Such a largely successful radical translation 
would otherwise be impossible, regardless of the extraterrestrials' intelligence.  See supra note 20.  
The earth-extraterrestrial situation may not be entirely symmetrical, however: if the costs to us of 
their successful deception greatly exceed the costs to them of an unsuccessful deception, they can 
afford translation errors more than we can. 
[FN22] I make this argument not as a frustrated writer of science fiction, but to note in all seri-
ousness the possibility that sending messages into outer space might result in contacting a hostile 
intelligence.  It is the starkest example I can think of to illustrate the point that for communication to 
make sense, the sender of the message ought in advance to know a great deal about the receiver of 
the message.  Although Carl Sagan and others convinced the public to support the attachment of the 
message to the Pioneer probes, see, e.g., Sagan, Sagan & Drake, supra note 18, I reserve the opinion 
that the project seems to have been fundamentally misconceived. 
After I wrote the above, a student told me about an old "Twilight Zone" television episode in 
which a cryptologist attempted to translate a book written by seemingly altruistic visiting aliens.  
The book was entitled To Serve Man. As the cryptologist prepares to board ship for a visit to the 
aliens' planet, his assistant tells him that the book was a cookbook.  R. Serling, "To Serve Man," 
The Twilight Zone (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1962).  Damon Knight, the author of the 
short story on which the episode was based, recognized the unlikelihood of "serve" having the same 
double meaning in both English and the aliens' language, and "'tried to cover [himself] by having 
the narrator's friend remark that some of the idioms were very much like English.'" M. Zicree, The 
Twilight Zone Compansion 237 (1982). 
[FN23] See H. Putnam, Representation and Reality 75 (1988) ("Functionalists like myself or 
David Lewis recognize that an ascription of meaning to someone's 'representations,' an interpreta-
tion of someone's language (or thought-signs), must proceed simultaneously with the ascription of 
beliefs and desires to the person being interpreted." (footnote omitted)). 
[FN24] N. Wiener, God & Golem, Inc. 59-60 (1964). 
[FN25] L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ¶¶68-70, at 33e (G.  Anscombe trans.  
1953).  Wittgenstein adds: "Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind 
when he gave me the order?" Id. 
[FN26 ] Fuller, supra note 13, at 625. 
[FN27] Standard office humor contains something like the following dialogue: 
BOSS: What reason can you possibly have to explain why you didn't do the work that I left for 
you this morning? 
EMPLOYEE: Nobody told me to go ahead. 
[FN28] Which, theoretically, is always true.  Even if the sender is looking at the receiver, the 
sender cannot be certain about what the receiver is seeing, feeling, or thinking about.  A close corol-




who know each other and are looking at each other when they converse cannot be sure of what the 
other is hearing or understanding.  See W. Quine, supra note 20, § 16 at 79. 
[FN29] To be precise, she never learns what he "intends," but only learns what kinds of behav-
ior on her part make him angry.  She accordingly adjusts her behavior.  While she uses his vocal 
instructions as one rough guide to predicting whether he will become angry if she does not do thus-
and-so, she may also use other signals—his facial expressions, for instance. 
[FN30] I am not talking about things like preambles to statutes, because the preambles them-
selves have to be interpreted—usually adding to the headaches of the statutory interpreter.  No mat-
ter how artfully worded the preamble, there is always the question whether it should be given more 
weight or less weight than the accompanying statute in those cases where the preamble and the stat-
ute seem to conflict with each other.  (Where they do not seem to conflict, the question of the pre-
amble's role does not arise.) Additionally, how can we interpret the prologue without a prologue to 
the prologue?  This is the "turtles all the way down" story.  See Cramton, Demystifying Legal 
Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1986). 
[FN31] V. Nabokov, King, Queen, Knave 1 (1968). 
[FN32 Are there other possible ways to interpret this paragraph? Consider: (1) the entire episode 
is a dream; (2) the episode is taking place on a planet in another galaxy where iron pillars actually 
are alive and walk; (3) the observer writing the paragraph is the train itself, knowing that it itself is 
inanimate and viewing the animated surroundings. 
[FN33] My favorite comment along these lines is the one made by Samuel Goldwyn from the 
deck of the Queen Mary as it left the New York pier on his wedding voyage to England.  He 
shouted in his booming voice to the crowd on the pier, "Bon Voyage!" 
[FN34] Cf. L. Wittgenstein, supra note 25, at pt. 1, ¶139 ("I see a picture; it represents an old 
man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick.—How?  Might it not have looked just the same if 
he had been sliding downhill in that position?  Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so"). 
[FN35] I have no evidence for this conjecture, but I would be very surprised if Nabokov had not 
read the dialogue either in his student days at Cambridge (1919-1922) or in his residency in Berlin 
(1922-1937).  Around 1934, when the Nabokovs were in Berlin and Mrs. Nabokov was working in 
the French embassy, she acted as an interpreter for Albert Einstein, who was then involved in an 
international pacifist movement.  See A. Field, Nabokov: His Life in Part 199 (1977).  Nabokov's 
fascination with relativity is clear from the extended discussion of time in his last novel Ada. V. 
Nabokov, Ada 535-63 (1969). 
[FN36] Einstein, Dialogue on Objections to the Theory of Relativity, reprinted in Albert Ein-
stein's Theory of General Relativity 99, 107 (G. Tauber ed. 1979).  There is some evidence in the 
text of King, Queen, Knave that Nabokov was consciously parodying Einstein.  Nabokov goes on to 
write: 
[N]ot only did all this fall behind; the entire old burg in its rosy autumn morning mist moved 
as well: the great stone Herzog in the square, the dark cathedral, the shop signs—top hat, a fish, 
the copper basin of a barber.  There was no stopping the world now.  In grand style houses pass 
by, the curtains flap in the open windows of his home, its floors crackle a little, the walls creak, 




from the quickening jolts, and ever more rapidly, more mysteriously, travel the houses, the ca-
thedral, the square, the sidestreets. 
V. Nabokov, supra note 31, at 2. 
Einstein's "Dialogue" had mentioned a church steeple: "[W]hy then did the church steeple near 
the train not topple when together with the environment it sustained the shock—why do such results 
of the jolt manifest themselves so one-sidedly only in the train . . . [?]" Einstein, supra, at 106. 
[FN37] Einstein, supra note 36, at 107 n.1. 
[FN38] I discussed the disutility of intentional and motivational analysis in D'Amato, Psycho-
logical Constructs in Foreign Policy Prediction, 11 J. Conflict Resolution 294, 294-95 (1967). 
[FN39] See M. Minsky, The Society of Mind §§ 30.3-30.5 (1986). 
[FN40] It is not even necessary for me to make this claim about Nabokov as a real person.  It 
suffices for me to say that we may attribute an intent to the author of the book irrespective of the 
question—which we can never know—whether Nabokov actually had that intent.  The author of the 
book is not equivalent to Nabokov the person (contrary to Bertrand Russell's famous "identity" be-
tween Scott and the author of Waverley), because if we take Nabokov's view of a book as a conver-
sation between author and reader, the "author" in that sense is the fictional character who wrote the 
book.  For a self-parody of this point, see V. Nabokov, Lolita 313-19 (1955) (author's postscript); 
cf. V. Nabokov, Pale Fire (1962) (editor and annotator of the book is a fictional character). 
This same line of reasoning can apply to statutory interpretation.  For instance, if we talk about 
the original intent of the framers of the Constitution, it may be less valid to look at the biographies 
of each framer to figure out his constitutional philosophy and then try to combine them, than it 
would be to assume an Aggregate Mind that came together in Philadelphia and worked out the text 
of the Constitution.  The latter—even though it borders on the fictional—may get us closer to "in-
tent" (if that is our goal) than any amount of speculation about the real lives, motives, and desires of 
the individual framers. 
[FN41] A similar point is made in a different context by R. Rorty, Is There a Problem About 
Fictional Discourse?, in Consequences of Pragmatism, 110, 135-37 (1982).  Rorty says that all the 
ontological work of the linguistic philosophers (from Russell to Quine) has acted to set up the pos-
sibility of novelists and poets "violating the space defined by the proscenium arch." Id.  at 135.  
Writers such as Borges, Nabokov, and Wallace Stevens achieve many of their word-and-object ef-
fects largely (Rorty unpersuasively assets) only because of the background myth implanted by lin-
guistic philosophers.  "What is most distinctively modern in modern literature depends for its effect 
upon [philosophical] straight men. . . ." Id. at 136. 
[FN42] For a good philosophical discussion of the importance of probabilistic statements as op-
posed to certainty statements, see W. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the 
World 184-205 (1984). 
[FN43] It was the academic year of 1958-59, and the royalties that poured in for his best-selling 
Lolita would lead the next year to his retirement from teaching.  A. Field, supra note 35, at 278. 
[FN44] Many of Professor Nabokov's lectures have been published (but, alas, not as they were 
delivered; the publications have been from his own lecture notes); altogether, they will serve admi-




Good Writers, in Lectures on Literature 1-6 (F. Bowers ed.  1980); V. Nabokov, The Art of Transla-
tion, in Lectures on Russian Literature 315-21 (F. Bowers ed. 1981); V.  Nabokov, Lectures on Don 
Quixote 1-4 (F. Bowers ed. 1983) (fiction vs.  reality). 
[FN45] I can still recall the implied criticism in his voice as he stretched out the pronunciation 
of the word "de-fin-i-tive." 
[FN46] Our knowledge of the "real" Madame Bovary acts as a sort of theory about the fictional 
Madame Bovary.  But like any other theory, the theory itself may blind us to the truth. 
[FN47] Fiction is necessarily modeled on the real world but is not a depiction of the real world.  
Cf.  H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History 1-5 (1981) (contending that no text is a depiction of the 
real world unless the author intended it to be so).  Putnam's assertions engendered a great deal of 
controversy, and in a recent book Putnam has attempted to modify his notion of intentionality, mov-
ing both toward a holistic view of interpretation and a greater acceptance of Quine's views about 
meaning.  See H. Putnam, Representation and Reality (1988).  The California Court of Appeals 
failed to appreciate the point that a work of fiction may come close to reality, but that the slight gap 
between fiction and reality makes all the difference, in a poorly reasoned decision regarding the 
novel Touching. See Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App.  3d 61, 76-78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 38-39, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979) (affirming for plaintiff in libel case; defendants unsuccessfully argued 
that libelous publications had to contain false statements of fact, and since the publication at issue 
was fiction, its characters were factual representations only of fictional characters and not of real 
persons). 
[FN48] By "text" I mean any text or any number of texts.  Thus if we think we can determine 
the intent of Congress by looking at the "legislative history" of a statute, all we are doing is adding a 
lot of text to the statute itself (text consisting of committee reports, Senate debates, and so forth).  
The question persists: what was the intent of Congress when it created all this additional legislative 
history?  What was the intent of the persons who spoke on the floor of the Senate?  Indeed, were 
certain items slipped into committee reports in order to falsify the legislative history and thus 
achieve an "interpretation" favored by a particular interest group?  As Professor Fish said in a recent 
essay, "Once words have been dislodged as the repository of meaning in favor of intention, no 
amount of them will suffice to establish an intention since the value they have will always depend 
on that which they presume to establish." Fish, Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in S. Fish, 
supra note 8, at 11. 
Generations of law students have been taught that the intent of Congress or the intent of the 
framers can be ascertained by poring over vast amounts of legislative history.  They will probably 
never accept—despite the irrefutability of Fish's argument—that all that additional text cannot, as a 
matter of logic, tell us the intent behind even the simplest statute or constitutional provision. 
[FN49] In class Nabokov would often become exasperated at the English translations we used, 
and on occasion would read us the text in the original language (for the cadence) and then render his 
own translation.  Anyone so attuned to the nature of translation as Nabokov (he later gave the world 
a monumental translation of Pushkin's Eugene Onegin) would never have said that an author's intent 
is identical to the words the author used.  The point is subtle, however, because of Nabokov's em-
phasis upon style.  Style, he told us, was everything.  How something was said was more important 
than what was said.  Yet the style was a way to capture the image (that is, the image of the artist's 




Cf. L. Wittgenstein, supra note 25, at ¶120: "You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, 
and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the 
word.  Here the word, there the meaning.  The money, and the cow that you can buy with it." 
[FN50] Judge Posner posits a world of difference between the two.  See Posner, Law and Litera-
ture: A Relation Reargued, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1351 (1986). Professor Fish argues that every reason 
Judge Posner adduces for the difference between law and literature is culturally contingent and not 
in the least necessary.  See Fish, Don't Know Much, supra note 1. 
[FN51] Our understanding of the Nabokov text quoted above, supra note 31 and accompanying 
text, depends upon our assumption that the text is describing the real world (albeit relativistically or 
existentially).  Because the work of fiction by definition cannot be checked against any real train 
station, the passage in the novel is open to the strange interpretation that in the "world of the novel" 
trains stand still while train stations move backward.  The "world of the novel" is an artificial con-
struct, and it can be "interpreted" any way the reader wants; hence, a literary interpreter can claim 
that in the world of the novel as she sees the world, certain strange things are happening that the or-
dinary reader misunderstands because the ordinary reader mistakenly assumes that the world of the 
novel is the real world. 
In conversations and letters I have exchanged over the years with Professor Alfred Appel, who 
is one of the foremost students of Nabokov, we have talked about how the population of the artifi-
cial world of the novel is sometimes made up of characters from other novels.  There is a rich vein 
of literary interpretation waiting to be mined in this regard.  A twist on this theme is the brief ap-
pearance of Flaubert himself at Madame Bovary's bedside at the end of that novel—as interpreted 
by Nabokov.  Professor Nabokov mentioned in class that by the end of the novel Flaubert had at-
tained such empathy for Emma Bovary that he materialized in the novel to be at her bedside.  We 
then ask: has the author made his appearance in the novel as a fictional, or a real, character? Con-
sider Woody Allen's plunge into the world of Madame Bovary in W. Allen, The Kugelmass Epi-
sode, in Side Effects 41 (1980), which foreshadowed the surreal premise of his (rather unlikable) 
motion picture, The Purple Rose of Cairo, in which the hero steps out of a black-and-white movie 
and into the (technicolor) audience to romance a movie-struck fan, while the rest of the characters 
on the screen wait around impatiently for the hero to come back.  A similar theme is far better real-
ized in Pirandello's play, Six Characters in Search of an Author.  See L. Pirandello, Six Characters 
in Search of an Author (J. Linstrum trans. 1979). 
[FN52] Fish says, 
It is not that we first read the statute and then know its purpose; we know the purpose 
first, and only then can the statute be read. 
. . . . 
A sentence is never not in a context.  We are never not in a situation.  A statute is never 
not read in the light of some purpose.  A set of interpretive assumptions is always in force.  
A sentence that seems to need no interpretation is already the product of one. 
S. Fish, supra note 1, at 280, 284. 
[FN53] Fuller, supra note 13, at 624. 





[FN55] The same sort of skepticism about judicial lawmaking was expressed by Jeremy Ben-
tham in his various writings.  See, e.g., J. Bentham, The Constitutional Code bk. 2, ch. 12, § 19, in 9 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham 1, 502-04 (J. Bowring ed. 1962) (establishing procedures in model 
constitutional code whereby the legislature would be informed of and could monitor contested judi-
cial constructions of statutes). 
[FN56] Cf.  Wittgenstein's remark, "[T]he application of a word is not everywhere bounded by 
rules." L. Wittgenstein, supra note 25, ¶84. 
[FN57] Fish, Uses of Theory, supra note 1, at 1792 (1987). 
[FN58] In the case of collapsible corporations, the higher tax is the income tax.  The planner of 
the collapsible corporation wants to pay taxes at only the capital gains rates, which until the full im-
plementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§1-1501 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), were 
significantly lower than the income tax rates.  As I did my research on the subject, I could see 
that—given any court decision interpreting the collapsible corporations section—one could struc-
ture a more complex interlocking corporate structure (using, for example, subsidiaries and trusts) 
that would apparently take account of every objection raised in that court decision and yet achieve 
the tax planner's purpose of transforming ordinary income into capital gains.  Literal compliance 
with the Internal Revenue Code and complete tax avoidance are available to any lawyer who is suf-
ficiently ingenious and industrious and whose client has a sufficient financial motivation to avoid 
the tax. 
[FN59] Universal tax avoidance does not take place because attorneys' fees for structuring com-
plex transactions to avoid taxes are too high for most people.  Yet whenever a particular tax avoid-
ance scheme—one that is in literal compliance with the tax code—is publicized, typically either the 
Internal Revenue Service reconstrues the Code to void the scheme or Congress itself plugs the 
loophole.  Plugging the loophole does not take away the opportunity for tax avoidance; it simply 
increases the costs of avoidance. 
Large corporate buy-outs, acquisitions, and mergers are nowadays preceded by an advance 
Treasury ruling, spelling out the tax consequences of the deal.  Even though the Treasury itself may 
not understand the Code, corporations are often content with obtaining such rulings because of the 
reduction of uncertainty.  A lot of tax "law" is created in this process; it would be metaphysical to 
claim that the Treasury is somehow doing what Congress intended. 
There are times when even Congress throws in the towel.  Having passed the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Congress decided that it was unable to figure out in advance what tax practitioners would do 
with the subpart on asset acquisitions, and hence enacted Section 337(d), which delegates to the 
Secretary of the Treasury the power to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out the purposes of the amendments made to this subpart by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, including . . . regulations to ensure that such purposes may not be circumvented through the 
use of any provision of law or regulations. . . ." I.R.C. § 337(d) (West 1988). 
[FN60] Loophole-plugging leads to problems of its own.  The tax statutes become so convoluted 
by accretion of loophole-plugs that Internal Revenue agents cannot understand them—with a con-
sequent loss of tax revenue. 
[FN61] If the amount of potential tax is high enough, as in the case of estates of the very rich, 




invitation that Congress has held out to the courts to apply the tax code according to its words.  
Such a positivist approach virtually guarantees unlimited tax avoidance if the amount of money that 
can be avoided is large enough to pay for ingenuity on the part of lawyers who, simply in order to 
avoid paying taxes, will structure an estate many years before the testator dies.  Hence, George 
Cooper has found that complex paper transactions suffice to enable the largest estates—those able 
to hire the best tax attorneys—to escape estate tax entirely.  Indeed, the escape is so thorough that 
these estates often plan to pay a modest tax—say, five percent—simply to avoid public outcry that 
could lead to congressional reform.  See Cooper, A Voluntary Tax?  New Perspectives on Sophisti-
cated Tax Avoidance, 77 Colum. L.  Rev. 161, 163 (1977) ("It may be that the real certainties of 
this world are death and tax avoidance."). 
[FN62] See D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1983). 
[FN63] 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
[FN64] See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 1005 (1967); Commissioner v. Transport Trad-
ing & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949). 
[FN65] In spite of all that has been written about the business purpose doctrine, sham trans-
actions, net effect, and the role of the court in looking through form to find substance, no au-
thoritative, explicit rationale for judicial intervention to frustrate plans for tax avoidance has 
ever been given.  The unpleasant conclusion remains that predicting the outcome of a concrete 
case in many of these areas, after a flood of decisions, remains often difficult and sometimes 
impossible. 
Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of 
Taxation, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 355, 389 (1963). 
The "business purpose" theory only adds another layer of complexity to tax avoidance.  Lawyers 
will have to structure transactions so that they will seem to have a business purpose.  Like loophole-
plugging, the "business purpose" doctrine serves only to drive up the cost of lawyering to achieve 
tax avoidance and therefore may raise tax revenues. 
"Business purpose" is thus a theory chasing other tax theories.  No amount of guessing a priori 
what kind of statute and what kind of statutory interpretive theory are best will do the tax job.  That 
does not mean that the tax job cannot be done.  Rather, taxation may be viewed as a huge, complex 
game: certain words (whatever they are) if enacted into a code will bring in a certain amount of 
money every year, and by tinkering with the words that amount of money either goes up or goes 
down.  All is a matter of experimentation: What sorts of statutory wordings bring in the most reve-
nue?  Although no one seems to want to take this approach, it could be done with experimental con-
trols and statistical validations, and the results could be eye-opening and counterintuitive (for ex-
ample, is it possible that creating loopholes, rather than plugging them, will increase revenue?). 
[FN66] See Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1988). Professor Levmore's valiant attempt to reduce this complex area of 
practice into rules as simple (but as vague!) as that recharacterizations must be "complete," "consis-
tent," "brief," and "direct" may provide courts with new justificatory language but, I predict, will 
hardly make a substantive difference in the jungle of tax planning. 




[FN68] The clearest examples of failure are those in which "applying the words" leads to absurd 
results.  Judges and juries are reluctant to apply the words literally in these situations.  Streetwise 
police officers "wink" at minor infractions.  A policeman once told me that, riding around in his 
squad car he spots hundreds of minor traffic infractions a day, but he only writes tickets for the few 
serious or blatant ones. 
[FN69] M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 291 (1987). 
[FN70] I tried to give some examples of outrageous hypotheticals in D'Amato, The Decline and 
Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. Legal Educ. 461, 468-78 (1987). 
[FN71] R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 45 (1986). 
[FN72] Is a "book" something a "bookie" does when he "makes book?" Is a book what bridge 
players minimally attempt to achieve?  Can an author store a "book" on her word processor? Such 
undecidable questions are the meat and potatoes of first-year law courses: Was the plaintiff an "em-
ployee" or an "independent contractor?" What is an "employee?" Was the defendant "negligent?" 
What is "negligence?" Was the writer "harmed" when she was libeled, even if the sales of her book 
skyrocketed after the libel?  Is "harm" objectively determinable?  Eventually, students are supposed 
to understand that the answers to these questions cannot be attained by staring at the words, al-
though I can attest that not every student "gets it." 
[FN73] I could have added, but didn't, that a "topologist" has been defined as a person who can't 
tell the difference between a doughnut and a cup of coffee. 
[FN74] Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527, 531 (1982). 
[FN75] Fish, Wrong Again, supra note 1, at 303. 
[FN76] Critics have been sharply divided as to the purpose of "The Murder of Gonzago" in 
Hamlet. But their discussion of purpose invariably ties the play-within-a-play to the tragedy-plot of 
Hamlet. I am suggesting that it fills a different role—stepping back from the tragedy-plot and point-
ing to what the play in its entirety is really about—the comedy-plot.  In this interpretation, the reac-
tion of the characters in the tragedy-plot to "The Murder of Gonzago" is brilliantly humorous—the 
same way Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author is an extended humorous conceit; in 
both, the playwright detaches from the real play (the comedy) what seems to be going on in the arti-
ficial play (the tragedy).  See L.  Pirandello, supra note 51.  Could Shakespeare possibly have had in 
mind, just for a little pun, a parallel between "The Murder of Gonzago" as a playlet and the star as a 
hamlet? 
[FN77] Stanley Fish has convincingly argued that Coriolanus is a play about speech-acts.  S. 
Fish, supra note 1, at 244-45.  If Coriolanus is a play about performatives, Hamlet is a play about 
performances. 
[FN78] Steve Martin's movie, Pennies from Heaven (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1981), seems to 
me to be an attempt to be very funny about grossly depressing subject matter (it ostensibly takes 
place during the Great Depression).  But the humor doesn't work; it may be a century or two ahead 
of its time.  I can conceive of laughing at the movie, but when I saw it I actually found it quite sad.  
I can also imagine extraterrestrials landing in their flying saucers atop a movie theater, going inside, 




Both Steve Martin and Lenny Bruce before him have been teachers of comedy.  They have ex-
panded our ability to understand and appreciate humor.  For humor, I believe, is something we learn 
as it develops in our cultural history.  A good test of the development of humor is to view some of 
the leading motion picture comedies of the 1930's.  Many of their scenes (such as pratfalls, men 
dressed in women's underclothing, extended misunderstandings based on initial misidentifications) 
are distinctly unfunny today.  These scenes represent static time-slices of comedy.  Today we laugh 
more at comedy that is structural and dependent upon exquisite timing.  Noel Coward's comedies, 
which were ahead of their time and underappreciated in the 1930's, are now coming into their own.  
Consider his masterpiece Private Lives.  N. Coward, Private Lives (1930).  There isn't a laugh-line 
in the whole play, but properly performed, its humor based on structure and timing makes it one of 
the funniest plays in the theatrical repertoire.  This isn't a case of the interpretation of Noel Coward's 
play changing, for I imagine that Gertrude Lawrence and Noel Coward themselves performed it in 
the 1930's as well as anyone can today (with the possible exception of Maggie Smith).  Rather, the 
audience has changed: we have moved toward Coward's conception of humor.  Like Nabokov's 
work, Coward's plays are now "finding" their proper interpretive audience.  (Indeed, to put a rubber 
band around this gratuitous mini-analysis, Coward's one-act Shadow Play, N.  Coward, Shadow 
Play, in Tonight at 8:30: Plays by Noel Coward (1935), is distinctly a forerunner of the "black hu-
mor" of Lenny Bruce and Steve Martin.) 
[FN79] For an example of this kind of bravura acting—although not in a comedy—consider 
Kate Nelligan's performance in the motion picture Eye of the Needle (United Artists 1981).  She 
managed to play the role of an unknowing housewife to the murderer in the movie (Donald Suther-
land) while at the same time signalling to the audience that she was fooling the murderer by playing 
a role.  Ms. Nelligan brought this feat off so magnificently that it has apparently gone unnoticed—
the best proof of perfect acting.  (Recently critics have begun to accord recognition to Kate Nelli-
gan's ability as an actress, but, so far as I am aware, without noting the difficulty of her task in Eye 
of the Needle and how she brought it off with apparent effortlessness.) 
[FN80] Stanley Fish says that "no reading, however outlandish it might appear, is inherently an 
impossible one." S. Fish, supra note 1, at 347. 
[FN81] This is the point of supra note 78 concerning the growing receptivity of the comedies of 
Noel Coward.  The point, however, is not a logically necessary one; the Lowenheim-Skolem proof 
would say in effect that we can add a description of the audience's mind-set to the text we're inter-
preting, and then radically reinterpret the entire package in an infinite number of ways.  See infra 
notes 96 and 102. 
[FN82] "[S]uch stuff As dreams are made of." W. Shakespeare, The Tempest, act IV, sc. i, lines 
156-57. 
[FN83] Of course, there are instances where courts have gotten into a running interpretive dia-
logue with legislatures.  In Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the Court found (for reasons that seem archaic today) that professional 
baseball was not covered by the antitrust acts.  Through the years, Congress had many occasions to 
amend the antitrust acts to cover baseball, but did not do so.  In Toolson v. New York Yankees, 
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), the Court interpreted congressional silence as supporting the baseball ex-
emption (despite what seems to me to be a determinative point that it takes more votes to pass a 
statute than to fail to pass one, and hence the failure to pass a statute in the years between the two 




declined to hold that professional boxing should be given the same exempt status as baseball, de-
spite the failure to discern any reason why the sports were different.  United States v. International 
Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). For similar considerations in the tax area, see James v. United 
States, 366 U.S. 213, 230-35 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
[FN84] Sometimes this task seems beyond the ability of legislators.  For example, Professor 
Karl Klare has demonstrated the Supreme Court's unwillingness to read and follow the legislative 
history of the Wagner Act insofar as Congress apparently intended to extend labor's role in man-
agement.  See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978). This unwillingness may have been in part 
deliberate (designed to preserve fundamental capitalist relationships) and partly inadvertent (due to 
limited judicial ability to understand the issues).  The story could be an object-lesson for Congress: 
if you want to legislate a social revolution, do not try to do it in one statute no matter how compre-
hensive it is, because the courts will either misunderstand or misconstrue it.  Instead, engage in 
thoroughgoing tinkering with and amending of many statutes over a period of time; you have to 
weave the social revolution carefully into the fabric of the existing legal order.  (This prescription, 
in turn, suggests a possible theoretical-rhetorical defense of the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the Wagner Act: Congress's failure to pass the across-the-board legislation that would be necessary 
to alter fundamental social relationships suggests an interpretation that Congress didn't "really" in-
tend as radical a Wagner Act as Congress said it intended!) 
[FN85] Hence positivists stress the logical term "validity" in their theories.  A statute is "valid" 
if it can be traced to the highest law in the land (the "rule of recognition" or the Constitution).  A 
judicial decision is "valid" if it passively applies the statute to cases that fall within the core mean-
ing of the statute.  See H. Hart, The Concept of Law 97-107 (1961). 
[FN86] See L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 31-32 (1940) (custom); Fuller, Human Interac-
tion and the Law, 14 Am. J. Juris. 1 (1969) (diversity and breadth of "law"). 
[FN87] Despite the pains Hume took to distinguish between the two.  See D.  Hume, 2 A Trea-
tise of Human Nature bk. 3, pt. 1, § 1 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1909) (1739-40). 
[FN88] See, e.g., G. Hegel, Natural Law 75-79 (T. Knox trans. 1975) (1801-02) (criticizing 
Kant's account of practical reason on similar grounds); cf. C. Haines, The Revival of Natural Law 
Concepts 323-49 (1930) (giving examples of how natural rights theorists have employed the rheto-
ric of objective validity in a variety of contexts).  Nearly all of the great eighteenth century political 
theorists were rhetorical masters at demonstrating that their political agendas were simply descrip-
tive of political forces currently in place. 
[FN89] Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L.  Rev. 593, 607 
(1958); see H. Hart, supra note 85, at 125-26; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958). 
[FN90] Hart, supra note 89, at 607.  For an extended analysis of the Hart-Fuller exchange on 
this point with reference to cybernetic theory, see A. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 133-39. 
[FN91] M. Kelman, supra note 69, at 12. 




[FN93] Fuller, supra note 89, at 663.  The example I use in my Jurisprudence classes concerns 
Professor H. L. A. Hart himself attempting to enter the public park with his book The Concept of 
Law tucked under his arm.  The guard on duty says: 
GUARD: You cannot take that into the park. 
HART: Why not?  It's my book. 
GUARD: The sign says "No vehicles in the park." 
HART: But this book isn't a vehicle.  For instance, it doesn't have a motor, you can't travel in it, 
it doesn't consume petrol. . . . 
GUARD: Do you agree that I have no discretion in the matter?  That I have to go by the exact 
definition of "vehicle?" 
HART: Yes, I certainly agree to that. 
GUARD (taking out a slip of paper from his pocket): Well, here it is.  I copied it from the dic-
tionary.  It says that a book is a vehicle for ideas. 
[FN94] Godel also "proved that is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a 
very large class of deductive systems—elementary arithmetic, for example—unless one adopts 
principles of reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the 
systems themselves." E. Nagel & J. Newman, Godel's Proof 6 (1958).  For discussions of Godel's 
proofs, see E. Nagel & J. Newman, supra; D. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden 
Braid 438-60 (1979). 
[FN95] That Godel's proof applies to language and not just to mathematics has been shown in 
R.  Smullyan, Forever Undecided: A Puzzle Guide to Godel 173-80 (1987). 
[FN96] The "case" can be decided either way consistent with any legal theory.  This result fol-
lows from the Lowenheim-Skolem mathematical proofs of the 1920's: that there is an infinite num-
ber of equally plausible theories to "explain" (or give the appearance of uniformity in) any given 
line of cases, as well as an infinite number that can "predict" the result in the next case any way that 
you want that result to come out. 
Here is how any prior theory can be used to "explain" any desired result.  Suppose we have the 
following sequence of numbers: 2, 4, 6. I ask you to give me the next number in the series.  If you 
say "8," you have implicitly applied one possible theory about the sequence.  But the Lowenheim-
Skolem proofs showed, among other things, that any answer at all to my question can be shown to 
be the consequence of some theory.  Suppose instead you give me the number 10.  I then supply an 
appropriate theory: "the next number in the sequence is derived from adding the two preceding 
numbers, but when there is only one preceding number, add it twice." Following this formula, 2 + 2 
= 4; 2 + 4 = 6; 4 + 6 = 10, Q.E.D.  Suppose you pick a much stranger number, such as 7 2/3.  Again 
I provide a theory that produces the sequence 2, 4, 6, 7 2/3.  The theory is: "the next number in the 
sequence is derived from putting the preceding two numbers together and dividing by the second 
one." Thus 2 and 4 become 24; divided by 4 gives a quotient of 6.  Next, 4 and 6 put together be-
come 46; divided by 6 gives a quotient of 7 2/3, Q.E.D.  Naturally, the stranger the number you 
supply for the last number in the sequence, the more complex the formula; but it follows from 




bers however long.  Indeed, there will be an infinite number of formulae that will produce any string 
of numbers no matter how long the string. 
My point is that if the Skolem-Lowenheim result is possible in mathematics—a deductive, pre-
cise system—it is a fortiori possible in common-law adjudication.  No matter how many cases are 
given, there is an infinite number of explanatory verbal theories that fully explain their results.  No 
matter how many cases are given as precedents, there is an infinite number of theories that will pro-
duce the "next" decisional result any way that you want that result to come out.  Naturally some of 
these theories will be staggeringly complex, but the simple ones are not more likely to be "right." In 
mathematics there is no a priori assumption that the simpler of two theories is more likely to be 
right; mathematics itself is an invented discipline and hence simplicity cannot reflect any natural 
feature of mathematics.  Paradoxically enough, even though law is supposed to reflect a real social 
system, the simpler of two legal theories is more likely to be vague or ambiguous!  (For instance, 
we can say of a great many Supreme Court results that "there was a violation of the Due Process 
Clause," but that theory—although simple and elegant—tells us a lot less than more complex verbal 
theories.) 
For references to the Lowenheim-Skolem proofs, see infra note 102. 
When this article was going to press, I noticed a reference by Professor Schauer to a previous 
use in the legal literature of the sequence-of-numbers demonstration.  See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 427 (1985), citing Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of In-
terpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev.  781, 821-24 (1983). Professor Tushnet 
showed that several different numbers were possible successors to the sequence 1, 3, 5, 7, although 
he did not credit the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.  Professor Schauer then proceeded to "rebut" 
Professor Tushnet's answers by providing, inter alia, the following choices: (g) 1637, 1389; (h) 
.000000000027, 3.1415926535; (i) Reggie Jackson, Babe Ruth; (j) Cleveland, Newark; (k) none of 
the above; (l) all of the above.  Professor Schauer concludes that these answers are "clearly incor-
rect." He is clearly mistaken.  Lowenheim and Skolem proved that, given any sequence of numbers, 
a formula can be found (indeed, an infinite number of formulae can be found) that yields those 
numbers in precisely that sequence.  A formula can be derived (complex, though it would be) that 
would yield 1, 3, 5, 7, .000000000027, 3.1415926535,. . . .  All the other numbers suggested as pos-
sible answers could be added to this sequence, proving (l) true.  Option (k) is also provable; we pro-
vide a formula that yields none of the sequential numbers offered by Tushnet or Shauer.  As for (i), 
the answer depends upon what we mean by "correct." We can find a formula that yields: 1, 3, 5, 7, 
Reggie Jackson, Babe Ruth . . . if we take a position on what we mean by "correct." If we mean, 
"numerically correct," and we translate the letters in the names Reggie Jackson to their numerical 
equivalents (and these numerical equivalents can be any numbers—such as the numerical place in 
the alphabet of the individual letters, or their Godel number, or any other number)—then we can 
find a formula that yields those numbers in proper sequential order.  Or if we translate 1, 3, 5, and 7 
into letters, we can do the same thing; we can invent a formula (a part of which might be, for exam-
ple, "whenever you have a 'g' preceded by a vowel, add another 'g' but when you have a 'g' preceded 
by a consonant add an 'i'") that correctly produces the letters in the proper sequence.  Perhaps if Pro-
fessor Tushnet had indicated that his demonstration had been proven by Skolem and Lowenheim for 
all sequences and that there were an infinity of possible solutions, Professor Shauer would not have 




[FN97] Fuller's writing is incredibly opaque.  (He had the same problem as a teacher.) Yet he 
tried as hard as he could to be clear.  He is still the object of severe misinterpretation, yet struggling 
with a Fuller text well repays the effort.  For a good essay on the difficulty of reading Fuller and the 
misunderstandings of many commentators, see Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on 
Reading Fuller, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1073 (1986). 
[FN98] See, e.g., Fuller's "truck" example and my "book" example of supra note 93 and accom-
panying text. 
[FN99] Actually, there is a third category—falling outside the penumbra.  The line between pe-
numbra and nonpenumbra is as problematic as the line between penumbra and core, as I suggested 
in A. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 132-35. 
[FN100] Fuller at one time thought it could be solved by reference to the statute's presumed 
purpose.  See supra note 13. 
[FN101] See A. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 137. 
[FN102] See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.  The idea of theory as after-the-fact ra-
tionalization was rigorously proved in mathematics by Leopold Lowenheim and Thoralf Skolem, 
who published their results in the early 1920's.  What is now known as the Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorem states that for any axiom system one may choose to characterize any mathematical set (e.g., 
the positive whole numbers), there is an infinite number of other interpretations that are drastically 
different and yet also satisfy the axiom system.  Thus, for every theory one has that seems to char-
acterize certain facts, there is an infinite number of other theories that exactly characterize the same 
facts, many of which are drastically different from the original theory.  See M. Kline, Mathematics: 
The Loss of Certainty 271-73 (1980).  For example, if we take one Supreme Court case—or ten, or 
all of them—and fashion a theory, no matter how simple or complex, that "explains" the case or line 
of cases—other radically different theories can be constructed that exactly explain the same case or 
line of cases.  Generalizing further from Lowenheim-Skolem, any interpretation of anything what-
soever is only one of an infinite number of equally accurate interpretations.  Anything I see can be 
described in an infinite number of radically different ways.  Anything I do can be interpreted in 
radically different ways from the way I interpret what I do or any observer interprets what I do.  As 
summarized by Kline, 
suppose one adopts a system of axioms for a theory of sets and one intends that these 
axioms should permit and indeed characterize non-denumerable collections of sets.  One 
can, nevertheless, find a countable (denumerable) collection of sets that satisfies the system 
of axioms and other transfinite interpretations quite different from the one intended.  Id. at 
271. 
The final blow to certainty was Lorenzen's later proof that a set which is denumerable in one 
level may be non-denumerable in another.  See S. Korner, The Philosophy of Mathematics 154 
(1960). 
[FN103] Against the objection that such cases do not come up—that police do not bar fire 
trucks—intrudes the reality that a firefighter's union might raise the issue in a motion for an injunc-
tion.  In Buckoke v. Greater London Council, [1971] Ch. 655, 2 All E.R. 254 (C.A.), Lord Denning 
was faced with precisely this problem.  The union wanted to stop the practice of fire engines ignor-




held that fire engines, ambulances, and police cars may "shoot the lights." In true positivist fashion, 
he acted as a mini-legislature: "[W]e have grafted an exception on to the strictness of the law so as 
to mitigate the rigour of it." Id. at 670, 2 All E.R. at 259. 
[FN104] I do not claim that positivist-minded guards will necessarily bar police cars, only that 
they may have a tendency to do so.  If they do not bar police cars, they are not as likely as natural-
ists to have a ready theory to explain why they are not barring police cars.  They may simply regard 
police cars as "exceptional" with respect to all regulations.  See supra note 103.  Moreover, their 
decision to let in a police car may be followed by a decision to bar an ambulance or fire truck.  To 
the observer this would constitute irrational behavior, but the positivist guard may simply be trying 
to exclude as many vehicles as possible! 
[FN105] An extreme example was the reaction of Gestapo and Nazi military officers to any-
thing resembling an official document.  Raoul Wallenberg exploited this rampant positivism in Bu-
dapest when he forged hundreds of Swedish passports and successfully utilized them to rescue Jews 
from Eichmann's extermination attempts in 1945.  See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D.D.C. 1985); K. Marton, Wallenberg 81-87 (1982). 
[FN106] More generally, what we today regard as a positivistic explanation itself may change in 
the course of time, so that fifty years from now the reactions I ascribe to positivist receivers of the 
legislative message may well be universally believed to be exemplary of non-positivist receivers.  
As Professor Fish might put it, the word "positivism" is just as subject to reinterpretation (even 
radical reinterpretation) as any other word. 
[FN107] Compare Fish's point about Milton's "Samson Agonistes." The poem is now said to be 
about Christ "because he is nowhere mentioned.  Such an argument seems to fly in the face of the 
rules of evidence, but in fact it illustrates something very important about evidence: it is always a 
function of what it is to be evidence for, and is never independently available." S.  Fish, supra note 
1, at 272. 
[FN108] If the legislature is Congress and the statute is a major one whose constitutionality is 
sure to be tested in the Supreme Court, Congress clearly should take into account the jurisprudential 
theories of the existing Supreme Court justices in choosing the wording of the statute. 
 
 
